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Article 2

The Necessary Demise of Federal Common Law
Nuisance
Jeffrey C. Fort*
INTRODUCTION

The scope and content of federal common law nuisance have defied meaningful definition and consensus of opinion. First formally
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 1972 in Illinois
v.Milwaukee,' federal common law nuisance since then has been
applied by the federal courts with little uniformity in a variety of
environmental disputes.2 At the same time, since 1972 Congress
has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme of environmental
regulation. 3
It is because of this statutory development that Illinois v. Milwaukee has returned to the Supreme Court this term for reconsideration of the continued validity of federal common law nuisance.
The Court has the opportunity to lay to rest a body of law which
has become unnecessary and inconsistent with pervasive federal
regulation of this area. This article will trace the journey of Illinois
* Martin, Craig, Chester & Sonnenschein, Chicago, Illinois; B.A. 1972, Monmouth College, Illinois; J.D. (cum laude) 1975, Northwestern University; law clerk to the Hon. John M.
Karns, Jr., Illinois Appellate Court, 1975-1976; co-author, WATER POLLUTION (IICLE) Environmental Law Handbook, (1978). The author acknowledges the substantial assistance provided by Richard J. Kissel, Thomas H. Donohoe and Joanna C. New in the formulation and
development of the views presented in the article. The views stated herein are those of the
author; however, certain of these points were included in the brief amicus curiae of the
Illinois State Chamber of Commerce on behalf of the petitioner in Milwaukee v. Illinois,
U.S. No. 79-408.
1. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
2. Federal common law nuisance has been considered by many writers. E.g., GRAD,
TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1977); ZrNER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL, IN FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

(E. Dolgin and T. Guilbert, ed. 1974); Federal

Common Law in the Interlake Water Pollution Disputes, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 141 (1973);
Note, Federal Jurisdiction-Environmental Law-Nuisance-State Ecological Rights
Arising Under the FederalCommon Law, 1972 Wisc. L. REV. 597 (1972). The intent of this
article, however, is to explore the nature of federal common law and the inconsistencies of
that doctrine and its assumptions in the context of the policies underlying the major existing federal pollution control statutes.
3. See text accompanying notes 69-85 infra.
4. Certiorari was granted March 17, 1980, under the name of City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 445 U.S. 926 (1980).
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v. Milwaukee through the federal courts and discuss the issues
raised by this lengthy litigation. The historical development of federal common law nuisance and the current conflict among the circuits in interpreting this area of law will be explored. A detailed
analysis will be presented of federal environmental legislation and
the particular statutory provisions relevant to Illinois v. Milwaukee, as a basis for examining congressional and judicial policies
militating against maintainance of federal common law nuisance.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW NUISANCE

Illinois v. Milwaukee
In 1970, the Illinois Attorney General petitioned the United
States Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction 5 to hear
Illinois'6 claim against the Wisconsin cities of Milwaukee, Racine,
Kenosha and South Milwaukee, and the Sewerage Commissions of
the County of Milwaukee and the City of Milwaukee,' for polluting
Lake Michigan with raw sewage. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court denied the petition without prejudice.8 The
Court noted that although it was not required to exercise its original jurisdiction in every instance," jurisdiction would be declined
only if another forum were available. 10 The Court found that the
5. In Article III, § 2, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court is
granted original jurisdiction of all cases in which a state is a party. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1251 (1970), the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all controversies
between two or more states, 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1970), but only original jurisdiction of
actions between a state and a citizen of another state, 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3) (1970).
6. For ease of reference, the Attorney General's claim in the name of the "People of the
State of Illinois" will be used interchangeably with the usual reference to "Illinois." In practice, however, the Attorney General of Illinois may represent or contest actions by various
other agencies and officers of Illinois. E.g., People v. Pollution Control Board, 83 Ill. App. 3d
802, 404 N.E.2d 352 (1st Dist. 1980).
7. The defendants included the City of Milwaukee, the Sewer Commission of the City of
Milwaukee, and the Metropolitan Sewer Commission of the County of Milwaukee. These
entities will be collectively referred to herein as "Milwaukee."
8. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
9. In Utah v. United States, 394 U.S. 89, 95 (1969), the Court expressed its prediliction
to invoke its original jurisdiction "sparingly." In Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406
U.S. 109 (1972), decided the same day as Illinois v. Milwaukee, the Court encouraged a
sparing use of its original jurisdiction so that its mounting duties on the appellate docket
would not suffer.
10. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972). Illinois argued that this action fell
within the Court's exclusive jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), because it was a controversy between two states, Illinois and Wisconsin; it was argued that the municipalities
and sewerage commissions were instrumentalities of Wisconsin. Thus, according to Illinois,
the Court could not decline jurisdiction. The Court rejected this approach, holding that for
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), the word "states" did not include their public subdivi-
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district court could provide an alternate forum by asserting federal
question jurisdiction based on federal common law."
The Court in its analysis first discussed various federal statutes
concerning "interstate waters," but found that none of these acts
provided the remedy Illinois sought.12 The Court then considered a
possible common law claim:
Yet, the remedies which Congress provides are not necessarily the
only federal remedies available. "It is not uncommon for federal
courts to fashion federal law where federal rights are concerned."
...

When we deal with air and water in their ambient or inter-

state aspects, there is a federal common law ....'s
The Court reviewed its prior decisions in which federal common
law had been applied to apportion interstate waters" and to abate
public nuisances caused by pollution of interstate waters 5 and air
pollution crossing state boundaries.' 6 The Court then stated that
in the case before it, the character of the parties (sovereign powers)
and the nature of the subject matter (an "interstate" body of
water) required application of federal rule of decision. 7 The Court
held that federal law governed "'as a basis for dealing in [a] uniform standard with the environmental rights of a state against im-

sions. Id. at 98.
11. Diversity jurisdiction did not exist because this suit did not involve "citizens." The
Court discussed Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U.S. 179 (1933), where political subdivisions
were held to be citizens of their respective states for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, and
Portal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482 (1894), which settled that the diversity
jurisdictional requirement of a suit between citizens of different states is not satisfied by a
state suing a citizen of another state.
12. The Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976); National Environmental Policy Act, 42
U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1976); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976);
Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, 16 U.S.C. § 760e (1976); Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act,
16 U.S.C. § 661 (1976).
13. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972).
14. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589
(1945); Hinderlider v. LaPlata Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46
(1907).
15. New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); New York v. New Jersey, 256
U.S. 296 (1921); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
16. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
17. "[O]verriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision or where the
controversy touches basic interests of federalism" were cited as bases for fashioning federal
common law. "[Tihe pollution of a body of water such as Lake Michigan bounded, as it is,
by four States," according to the Court, fit these tests. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91,
105 n.6 (1972), citing Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See notes
38-40 infra and accompanying text.
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proper improvements by sources outside its domain.' ,18 Although

state standards could be considered, "[a]ny state law applied, however, will be absorbed as1' federal law and not be an independent
source of private rights."
The rationale for the Supreme Court's decision thus rested on
three considerations: (1) Congress had evidenced a federal interest
in environmental matters by the passage of pollution control legislation, even though no federal statute was directly applicable to
the case; 0 (2) the case involved conflicting interests of sovereigns:
the State of Illinois and municipal instrumentalities of Wisconsin;2" and (3) the concern to provide a non-partisan forum and rule
18. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 n.9 (1972). The court thus disavowed its earlier decision in Ohio v. Wyandotte, 401 U.S. 493 (1971), noting that decision had been "preoccupied" with state law. 406 U.S. at 102 n.3. See also note 45 infra and accompanying text.
This displacement of state law as the rule of decision is a concomitant feature of federal
common law. E.g., Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Ivy Broadcasting
v. American Telephone & Telegraph, 396 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1968); Ames-Enis Inc. v.
Midlothian Ltd. Partnership, 469 F. Supp. 939 (D. Md. 1979). "Federal common law is that
rather narrow body of decisional law which is applied in instances where state law cannot
supply the rule of decision and the federal courts are free to choose the appropriate rule."
Ames-Enis Inc. v. Midlothian Ltd. Partnership, 469 F. Supp. 939, 943 (D. Md. 1979).
19. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 n.5 (1972).
20. Id. at 101-02. By enacting the National Environmental Policy Act, the Fish and
Wildlife Refuse Act, the Refuse Act and the then-existing Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, the Court implied, Congress had exercised its constitutional powers to make "environmental law" a matter of federal interest. Had those statutes been lacking, the Court would
have been powerless to find federal common law in this area. See, e.g., Wilamette Iron
Bridge Co. v. United States, 125 U.S. 1 (1888) (holding that the Court had no authority to
decide a dispute involving an alleged obstruction to navigable waters because Congress, having adopted no legislation on this subject, had not evidenced a federal interest in the area);
cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947) (holding that the Court would not
create a common law remedy in favor of the United States for wrongful death to a serviceman because the issue was primarily a fiscal issue within the province of Congress and upon
which Congress had not legislated). This, of course, assumes there is no constitutional right
to environmental protection, as the lower courts have repeatedly held. See generally note 22
infra.
Of equal importance is the implicit recognition that, because no federal statute was directly applicable, the Court was not usurping a legislative function by creating a judicial
rule of law which would diverge from the congressional rule. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978) (holding that the Court could not fashion a judicial rule
of recovery for maritime torts when Congress had addressed the issue). Indeed, in Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972), decided the same day as Illinois v.Milwaukee, the Court made no mention of federal common law nuisance as a basis for jurisdiction; the case proceeded solely on antitrust claims.
21. 406 U.S. at 103-07. The Court compared the dispute over alleged pollution of Lake
Michigan to several prior cases where states had disputed rights to apportion interstate
waters and to prior cases involving pollution of water or air which then injured another
state. See text accompanying notes 41-45 infra.
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of decision while conserving the docket of the Supreme Court. 2
Having decided that the pollution of interstate waters was a cognizable claim under federal common law nuisance, and thus within
the federal question jurisdiction of a federal district court, the
Court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction and remitted the
parties to an appropriate district court.
The case went to trial in the Northern District of Illinois, despite the defendants' numerous attempts to dismiss the action."8
The trial court found in favor of Illinois and entered a judgment
ordering the defendants to cease discharging raw sewage into Lake
Michigan.24 The court also required the defendants to treat sewage
before discharging it, in compliance with effluent standards25 more
stringent than the minimum requirements of the Federal Water
6
Pollution Control Act.2
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the defendants challenged the
trial court's decision by questioning the continued validity of federal common law nuisance in view of comprehensive water pollution control legislation, the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,'" enacted since the 1972 Supreme Court decision. 8
In rejecting the defendants' challenge and affirming the trial court,
the Seventh Circuit made three important decisions about the
scope of federal common law nuisance. First, the court held that
the Clean Water Act 9 and its implementing regulations had not

22. See note 9, supra and accompanying text. The case did not purport to establish a
constitutional right to protection of environmental waters. No federal court has held that
there is such a right. See generally Township of Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F.
Supp. 1203, 1212 (D. N.J. 1978) and cases cited therein. Were there such a right, the extended analyses of the federal courts in environmental litigation as to whether the plaintiffs
were within the zone of protected interests would be unnecessary. E.g., Association of Data
Processing Services v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). But see People of Illinois v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. pending, No. 80-126, where the
Seventh Circuit held that the 1972 Illinois v. Milwaukee decision authorized a federal tort
for pollution of navigable waters.
23. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 4 E.R.C. 1849 (N.D. IUl. 1972) (motions to dismiss for lack of in
personam jurisdiction and improper venue); Illinois v. Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D.
Ill. 1973) (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted).
24. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 155 (7th Cir. 1979).
25. See note 164 infra and accompanying text.
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1970).
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1972).
28. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979). The issue concerning the continued validity of federal common law nuisance was first raised in an amicus brief by
Wisconsin.
29. In 1977 Congress made certain modifications to the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act and renamed it the Clean Water Act. Pub. L. 95-217 § 2, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977).
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pre-empted common law nuisance.30 Although the court indicated
that common law nuisance would be "informed" by the guidelines
contained in the federal act, nuisance doctrine was not confined to
the statutory definitions. The court, for example, refused to recognize as a defense to the common law claim Milwaukee's compliance
with the sewage discharge requirements of the Clean Water Act. 1
Second, the court purported to define federal nuisance. A nuisance,
it declared, is simply an activity carried on by the defendant that
causes an injury or significant threat of injury to some cognizable
interest of the complainant.3" Third, the court ruled that a pendent state law claim could not be maintained. 3
The Supreme Court granted Milwaukee's petition for a writ of
certiorari on March 18, 1980, to consider the continued validity of
federal common law nuisance." Two factors upon which the Court
rested its 1972 decision now may be determinative of the current
appeal. First, the Court in 1972 was sensitive to the deficiencies in
the existing federal regulatory mechanisms:
"Section 10(a) (of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act)
makes pollution of interstate or navigable waters subject to abatement' when it 'endangers the health or welfare of any person.'
The abatement that is authorized follows a long drawn-out procedure unnecessary to relate here. It uses conference procedure,
hoping for amicable settlements . .. "I
Second, the court recognized that further congressional action
could obviate the need for federal common law: "[ilt may happen
that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time preempt the field of federal common law nuisance."3 6 The writ of certiorari presents the question of whether this point has been
3
reached. 7

30. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979).
31. See notes 95-97 infra and accompanying text.
32. Id. at 165. This text is apparently borrowed from the encyclopedia. See 58 AM. JUR.
2d Nuisance § 1 at 555 (1971).
33. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 177 n.53 (7th Cir. 1979). The court rejected the
state claim because federal common law controlled this case, citing the Supreme Court's
decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
34. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 445 U.S. 926 (1980)..
35. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 102-03 (1972). For a detailed description of the
"cumbrous" procedures under the original Act, see Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 15758 (7th Cir. 1979).
36. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
37. The problem with maintaining nuisance lies in its use to override federal statutory
and state law criteria for pollution control. The issue is not exhaustion of administrative
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Nuisance in the Federal Courts

The Supreme Court's 1972 Illinois v. Milwaukee decision did
not purport to create any startling new principle of federal common law. Instead, it simply represented another instance of postErie recognition of federal common law tailored to special circumstances involving peculiarly federal interests.88 Although post-Erie
decisions reflect the Supreme Court's difficulty in defining when
recognition of federal common law is appropriate,39 the Court has
remedies or of equity deferring to law, though application of those judicially-developed principles might yield the same result. The question is simply one of judicial power. Further, the
issue discussed herein is one of creating a legal duty or rule of liability. The appropriate
remedy for a constitutional or statutory violation must be tailored to the nature and extent
of the breach or violation. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977). Finally, two major
interrelated assumptions form the basis of this article: (1) that in a democratic society, the
courts must generally defer to the rules of conduct laid down by the constitution or legislature, and (2) that the federal courts must generally also defer to state law. In other words,
federal common law is justified only when the constitution or statute clearly requires federal
pre-emption of areas not addressed by the Constitution or Congress. Accord, Dworkin, Hard
Cases, 88 H~Av. L. REv. 1057 (1975); Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978). But cf. Ragsdale, Ecology and the Role of the Federal Courts, 46 U.M.K.C.L. Rv.
221 (1977) (arguing that the federal courts are the only branch of government able to announce new principles of an economic-ecological order and should do so).
38. The express abolition of federal judicial authority to fashion general federal common
law is found in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In the opinion by Justice
Brandeis, it is abundantly clear that federal courts cannot declare an independent federal
judicial rule of decision in diversity cases, but instead must apply state law. The Court later
described the decision as a renunciation of the "brooding omnipresence" view of federal
judicial power represented by Swift v. Tyson. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102
(1945) citing Swift v. Tyson, (16 Pet.) 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
39. Although Erie renounced a general federal common law, see n.38 supra, the Court,
on the same day it decided Erie, reaffirmed its authority to invoke federal common law in
special situations. In Hinderlider v. LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92
(1938), the Surpreme Court was called upon to interpret a compact between Colorado and
New Mexico which had been approved by Congress. Analogizing this case to a boundary
dispute, the Court held it had the power to review and reverse a judgment by the Supreme
Court of Colorado that declared the compact unconstitutional. Id. at 105. Although the decision reaffirms the existence of a federal common law, it is important to note that this case
involved a classic federalist interest; the authority of the federal courts to settle interstate
disputes. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2, cl. 5, 6, 7, 8; Tns FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton). The
Court was simply deciding a case which had to be decided under federal law. But the fact
that federal courts may oversee interstate disputes does not mean that they can override
federal statutory rules. See notes 206-09 infra and accompanying text.
A few years after Erie, the Court did declare a federal common law rule for the negotiation of checks drawn on the federal treasury. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363 (1943). The need for uniformity and protection of the government provided the rationale for the refusal to apply state law and the creation of a federal judicial rule of decision.
This rationale for fashioning federal common law has been criticized on the grounds that
the government has no greater need for uniform rules controlling check negotiation than do
private firms that operate nationwide. Note, Federal Common Law, 82 HAzv. L. REv. 1512,
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set forth two criteria for federal common law: (1) the issue must
touch basic interests of federalism, or (2) the issue must raise an
overriding federal interest in a uniform federal rule of decision. 0
Disputes over state boundaries, interstate water appropriations,
and alleged abuses of interstate air and water have required the
development of federal common law because they involve a basic
interest of federalism. In the earliest case, Missouri v. Illinois,4 '
decided at the turn of the century, Missouri complained that an
artificial drain to be constructed by the Sanitary District of Chicago 42 would discharge sanitary waste into tributaries of the Illi-

nois River and thence into the Mississippi River along Missouri's
border. This discharge would pollute the rivers and cause a public
nuisance, injuring Missouri's sovereign interests. 4 The Supreme
1530 (1969). Shortly, thereafter, the Court energetically reaffirmed its support of Erie and
rejection of the "brooding omnipresence" of a general federal common law. In Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), a decision which has been described as an overly
zealous condemnation of Swift v. Tyson (Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-And the New Federal
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 383 (1964)), the Court held that a federal court sitting in
diversity could not ignore the state statute of limitations, because it would substantially
affect the outcome of the litigation. Clearfield Trust was not cited by the Court, although
the state rule rejected in Clearfield was quite similar to a state's statute of limitation-it,
too, cut off state defenses. The only difference between the two cases was that in Clearflield,
the federal government had been the plaintiff, while in Guaranty,the plaintiff was a private
person. Had an outcome-determinative analysis been applied in Clearfield, there would
have been no basis for a federal common law rule. And, less than ten years after Clearfield,
the Court held that because Congress was in charge of the Treasury and could, if it chose,
protect governmental interests by providing a recovery in damages to the United States for
injuries to its servicemen, the federal courts should not create a common law rule of liability. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947). These cases illustrate how very
difficult it has been for the Court to articulate a general principle for application of federal
common law.
40. Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-27 (1964), cited in Illinois
v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 105 n.6 (1972). Because the basis for federal common law turns on
the particular situation, further comparison to other substantive areas of the law is not particularly helpful.
41. 180 U.S. 208 (1901). See also Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
42. This public agency is now called the Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater
Chicago.
43. Ironically, this diversion of sanitary flows is historically connected to the policies
that led Illinois to sue Milwaukee in 1971. As a part of the Burnham Plan for the City of
Chicago and its lakefront, Illinois redirected the flow of the Chicago River from Lake Michigan to the Des Plaines River and thence into the Illinois River system. This diversion triggered a suit against the Sanitary District and is the basis for the Supreme Court's continuing supervision of the amount of water Illinois can take from Lake Michigan.
Illinois has historically imposed much more exacting water quality standards for its portions of Lake Michigan to permit use of the lake for drinking water as well as to promote
the recreational and aesthetic value of the lakefront. A continuation of this policy is found
in Rules 206 and 404(d) of Chapter 3 of the Illinois Pollution Control Board. As a direct
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Court overruled Illinois' demurrer to the claim, thereby approving
a federal action for nuisance.4 4 Subsequently, other states successfully brought federal actions for nuisance 45 for pollution of their
environment by neighboring states. It was in 1972, in Illinois v.
Milwaukee, however, that the Court finally christened this body of
law "federal common law nuisance"' "4 and thereby clearly brought
it within the federal question jurisdiction of the district courts.
Six months after Illinois v. Milwaukee4 7 was decided, Congress
overhauled the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, establishing a

result of the stringency of those standards, there are now no treated discharges deposited
into Lake Michigan from Illinois by sewage treatment plants. It was less costly to divert
those flows to the Fox and Des Plaines River systems than to treat the effluent to meet the
Lake Michigan standards. The same standards are the apparent basis for the Deep Tunnel
Project that will, when (or perhaps if) completed, eliminate discharges via the Chicago River
system of combined sewer overflow, and hence untreated sanitary waste, into Lake Michigan. Thus, the overall Illinois policy is to divert wastewater from Lake Michigan into the
Mississippi River basin.
44. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901). See also Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496
(1906).
45. In Georgia v. Tennessee, 206 U.S. 230 (1907), the Supreme Court provided Georgia a
forum to seek redress for the destruction of its forests and wildlife caused by noxious fumes
originating in Tennessee. In New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1920), New York City
challenged a New Jersey project to discharge sewage into New York Harbor. New Jersey
and Pennsylvania later returned the challenge in New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U.S.
473 (1921), and sought to enjoin New York City from dumping garbage into the Atlantic
Ocean.
When an interstate dispute has been addressed by appropriate and competent legislation,
however, the Court has not established its own rule of decision under federal common law
nuisance. The Court has deferred to the rule of law established by Congress, as for example
in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), where the Court, in a water apportionment
dispute among California, Arizona, and Nevada, applied provisions of the Boulder Canyon
Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617-617t (1976), which created a comprehensive scheme for apportionment of the mainstream waters of the Colorado River. The Court has also deferred to
state legislation, as in Hinderlider v. LaPlata Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), where the Court applied a compact between two states for the apportionment of an interstate stream; and Ohio
v. Wyandotte Chemicals, 401 U.S. 493 (1971), where state common law was applied to resolve a dispute between Ohio and Michigan over the pollution of Lake Erie. Justice Douglas
dissented from the application of state law in Wyandotte, and later in his majority opinion
in Illinois v. Milwaukee, distinguished Wyandotte as the result of a "pre-occupation" with
state common law. 406 U.S. 91, 102 n.3 (1972). Now, Illinois has urged the Supreme Court to
return to Wyandotte and hold Milwaukee to Illinois' common law nuisance. Brief for Respondent, People of the State of Illinois, No. 79-408 at 65. The district court had held Milwaukee to the Illinois law claims and the Court of Appeals reversed on that issue, Illinois v.
Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 191, 177 n.53 (1979) and also denied Illinois' petition for rehearing on
that issue. Illinois v. Milwaukee, No. 77-2246 (7th Cir., filed June 14, 1979). Illinois also filed
a petition for certiorari on this decision, No. 79-571, 48 U.S.L.W. 3341, which still has not
been ruled upon by the Court. 49 U.S.L.W. 14 (Oct. 28, 1980).
46. 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
47. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).

140
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comprehensive regulatory scheme.48 Notwithstanding the considerable remedies provided by the new Act, now known as the Clean
Water Act,4 9 claims under federal common law nuisance continued
to be asserted. The decisions of the lower federal courts in this
period reflect the uncertainty of the courts as to the proper scope
of the federal common law of nuisance in the "Environmental
Decade." 5
More than any other circuit, the Seventh Circuit has articulated
the scope of federal common law nuisance.5 1 The Seventh Circuit
has decided more nuisance cases than any circuit, and has extended the reach of federal nuisance law to the limit of the com52
merce power. A year after its decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee,
the Seventh Circuit held in Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling Corp.'5 that no private cause of action could be implied

48. See A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
Vol. 1, 95-158 (Committee print, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Legis. Hist.].
In its first opportunity to consider a question arising under the 1972 Amendments, the
Supreme Court, in the opening sentence of its opinion, stated:
This case poses certain questions concerning the proper construction of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendment of 1972, 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. §
1251 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. III) (1972 Act) which provides a comprehensive program for controlling and abating water pollution. Train v. City of New York, 420
U.S. 35, 37 (1975) (emphasis added).
Some of the more important provisions of the Act will be discussed below. See text accompanying notes 86-148 and 149-78 infra.
49. See note 29 supra.
50. In the 1970's, the environmental movement and environmentalism forged their way
into the statutes. See notes 69-85 infra and accompanying text. As a result of this political
advance, the 1970's have been called, inter alia, the "Environmental Decade."
51. The reason for this predominance might be that Lake Michigan borders all three
states in the circuit (Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin) and major portions of these states' boundaries are formed by the Mississippi, Ohio, Wabash and Menominee Rivers. Perhaps it is also
due to the zeal of former Illinois Attorney General Scott in prosecuting environmental
actions.
52. 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979);.see notes 27-33 supra and 149-78 infra and accompanying texts.
53. 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979). The court based its holding on the recently pronounced prnciples of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Cort was a stockholders derivative suit
for damages brought under 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1964), a criminal statute prohibiting corporate
political contributions in presidential elections. In determining that a private right of action
could not be judicially implied in that statute, the Court set out four factors to consider:
1) Does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?.
2) Is there any explicit or implicit indication of legislative intent to create or
deny a private remedy?
3) Is implication of a private remedy consistent with the legislative scheme?
4) Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law?
Id. at 80-85. In Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling Corp., 604 F.2d 1008, 1016 (7th Cir.
1979), the Seventh Circuit found that the first and, arguably, the third Cort factors weighed
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under the Clean Water Act. The court had no trouble, however, in
recognizing claims for damages arising under federal common law
nuisance. 4 As it did in Illinois v. Milwaukee, the court rejected
pendent state law claims as independent causes of action."'
The "high-water" mark in the Seventh Circuit's interpretation
of federal nuisance law came in March, 1980, in Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp." The court held that federal common law nuisance extended to include a claim by a state against a manufacturer located within that state for polluting interstate waters. The
court interpreted Illinois v. Milwaukee as extending federal judicial power to all suits involving an alleged injury to water of the
United States.5 7 The court equated the scope of its authority under
federal common law nuisance to the commerce power exercised by
Congress in enacting the Clean Water Act. It interpreted the term
"navigable water" as used in Illinois v. Milwaukee to include
"both the territorial seas and purely intrastate waters having no
necessary interstate impact.

'5 8

This led the court to conclude that

against implication of a private remedy, while the second and fourth were at best neutral.
Since under Touche Ross v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), congressional intent is the
central inquiry, and there is insufficient evidence of congressional intent to create a private
right of action, the Court refused to imply one under the Clean Water Act. 604 F.2d 1008,
1012 (7th Cir. 1979).
54. Id. at 1017-19. It is paradoxical that a federal common law remedy can exist where
an implied cause of action cannot. If there is no implied right of action because of a lack of
congressional intent, a fortiorari, no independent federal judicial rule of decision (federal
common law) can exist for that field of law. Having decided that the Clean Water Act did
not allow a private right of action, the Seventh Circuit should not have concluded that the
federal common law nuisance could apply. Yet, the Court did not even discuss the issue. Id.
at 1003-16, 1017-19. But see National Sea Clammers Assoc. v. City of New York, 616 F.2d
1222 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. granted, No. 79-1760, 49 U.S.L.W. 328 (Oct. 21, 1980), where the
Third Circuit upheld an implied private right of action under the Clean Water Act. The
Seventh Circuit's embrace of federal common law nuisance also is inconsistent with its finding that the enforcement mechanism under the Act is adequate, and hence no implied private cause of action need be created. Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling Corp., 604
F.2d 1008, 1016 (7th Cir. 1979).
55. Id. at 1021.
56. 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. pending No. 80-126. See also Note,
Federal Common Law Remedies for the Abatement of Water Pollution, 5 FORD. URBAN L.J.
549, 557 (1977), an analysis of the 1972 Illinois v. Milwaukee decision that accepts uniformity as an adequate justification for federal common law nuisance and does not discuss the
policies which, this author believes, mitigates against continued use of the doctrine.
57. Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623, 627 n.14 (7th Cir. 1980).
58. Id. at 627. This language is dicta and may be considerably beyond other court decisions as to the scope of the Commerce power. As a general rule, federal power over a navigable water within the meaning of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act extends to the
high water mark. United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co., 364 F. Supp. 349
(W.D. Ky. 1973), af'd, 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974). But bodies of water which have no
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no extraterritorial pollution effects need be alleged or proven in a
dispute over pollution of interstate waters. 59
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit, the First, Fourth, and Eighth
Circuits have all taken a more restrained approach, requiring a
multi-state controversy" or an interstate effect s ' to be present for
the application of federal common law nuisance. These circuits
have determined that a federal court cannot create standards of
conduct based upon nuisance simply because navigable water is allegedly polluted. 62 Under this view, an action for federal nuisance
will lie only when the interests of more than one state are involved.
Without a confrontation between or among state sovereign interests, there is no basis for applying federal common law.
Decisions in the Second Circuit reflect the tension between the
opposing viewpoints. The Second Circuit has summarily affirmed
district court decisions on both sides of the question."3 Most reconnection to interstate commerce are not within the powers of the federal executive to
control. E.g., National Wildlife Federation v. Alexander, 613 F.2d 1054, 14 E.R.C. 1214 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
59. Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623, 630 (7th Cir. 1980).
60. In Committee for the Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage Treatment System v.
Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976), the Fourth Circuit refused to declare conduct authorized by a federally-issued discharge permit unlawful (see notes 95-98 infra and accompanying text) where no multi-state controversy was pleaded. Although the Fourth Circuit has not
specifically found the Clean Water Act to be pre-emptive, Jones Falls has such an effect.
See also Ancarrow v. City of Richmond, 600 F.2d 443 (4th Cir. 1979), where the court refused to apply federal common law nuisance to a controversy deemed "strictly local." Id. at
445.
61. In Reserve Mining v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), the Eighth Circuit decided
that federal nuisance could not be applied in the absence of an "interstate effect." The court
rejected the United States' claim for air pollution in a suit also involving claims by Wisconsin, Michigan and Minnesota. Because the alleged emissions and their effect occurred within
one state, the court held federal common law nuisance inapplicable. See also Massachusetts
v. U.S. Veteran's Aministration, 541 F.2d 119 (1st Cir. 1976).
62. In Ancarrow v. City of Richmond, 600 F.2d 443 (4th Cir. 1979), the court denied a
claim under federal common law for damages arising from a public body's lawful pollution
of state waters, holding that the only possible remedy lay in state law and a Constitutional
taking of property claim. Also, in United States v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 627 F.2d 736 (5th
Cir. 1980), the Fifth Circuit held that where the Clean Water Act provided an exclusive
remedy for the United States to recoup oil spill clean-up costs, the United States could not
receive an additional recovery under federal common law nuisance. Cf. United States v.
Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597 (3rd Cir. 1974), where the court permitted a claim under
federal nuisance as well as a federal statute. The court noted, however, that traditionally,
relief was limited to equitable remedies. Id. at 611.
63. In an earlier case, United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt.
1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974), the Second
Circuit upheld the federal government's claim alleging oil spills in Lake Champlain, a body
of water wholly within the state of Vermont, despite the lack of an interstate effect, because
the lake was held to be a navigable water of the United'States. But in Parsell v. Shell Oil
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cently, the court set aside a district court decision

4

which held

that the Clean Air Act was pre-emptive of nuisance, pending a decision in the Illinois v.Milwaukee appeal.
The Third Circuit's ratio descidendi for applying federal common law of nuisance appears to be the need for a uniform rule of
decision. In National Sea Clammers Assoc. v. City of New York,"
the Third Circuit held that federal nuisance governed a claim by
various fishing groups against the City of the New York and several New Jersey municipalities for polluting navigable waters. The
court reasoned that the state courts of New York and New Jersey
might adopt differing standards under state nuisance laws. It
therefore recognized a federal tort claim under nuisance for damages to navigable waters."a An overriding federal interest in a uniform rule of decision seemed to be the basis for the court's
decision. 7
In sum, many circuits require an extra-territorial effect for the
application of federal common law nuisance as an independent
source of substantive environmental standards. On the other hand,
the Seventh Circuit will apply federal nuisance law regardless of
interstate impact whenever the defendant's activity "is causing an
injury or significant threat of injury to some cognizable interest of

Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Conn. 1976), af'd sub nom., East End Yacht Club v. Shell Oil
Co., 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1977), a claim for pollution of a harbor on Long Island Sound
was dismissed in part because the pollution did not allegedly affect waters of a neighboring
state. More recent decisions have held that a wholly intrastate body of water unconnected to
the flow of interstate commerce is not within the commerce power, and therefore federal
permits could not be required. E.g., National Wildlife Federation v. Alexander, 613 F.2d
1054, 14 E.R.C. 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
64. New England Legal Foundation v. Costle, - F.2d -, 11 E.R.C. 386 (2d Cir. 1980).
65. 616 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. granted, No. 79-1760, 49 U.S.L.W. 3281 (Oct. 21,
1980).
66. Id. at 1233-35.
67. See also United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597 (3rd Cir. 1974), where the
court noted that, in addition to a claim under the Refuse Act, the United States could sue
under federal common law nuisance for an injunction against a local land developer who was
dredging land bordered by an intercoastal waterway to build homesites without the prior
approval of the Army Corps of Engineers. The decision appears to rest upon the federal
authority over navigable waters, and thus, the need for a uniform federal rule of decision.
Id. at 611. As will be discussed below, this theory poses substantial difficulties. The notion
of uniformity as a basis for protection of the federal government is questionable. Note, Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1530 (1969). In the case of nuisance, uniformity
of result is patently illusory. A recent decision of the Supreme Court held that the mere fact
that title to federal lands is involved does not create a federal question; state law must be
inadequate or inconsistent with federal policy. Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977);
See also Wallis v. Pan-American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 71 (1966). Contra Illinois v.
Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 162 (7th Cir. 1979).
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the complainant."8 This position ignores the complexities of the
federal statutory scheme and the careful choices made by Congress
in recent environmental legislation.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE

Congress and the EPA
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee in
April, 1972, the field of federal environmental law has been transformed. In April, 1972, the main focus of environmental regulations and litigation was the National Environmental Policy Act.69
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had been organized
only one year earlier. 70 The EPA had just adopted federal ambient
air quality standards7 1 and had not yet approved a single state
plan to attain and maintain those standards.7 2 The EPA had
adopted new source performance standards for only a handful of
industrial processes.7 There were no direct federal controls over
waste disposal activities7 " and the program to control wastewater

68. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 165 (7th Cir. 1979).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 4331-32 (1976).
70. EPA was organized by presidential order and its initial responsibilities included assumption of the duties of the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration of the Department of Interior. 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (1970).
71. Section 109 of the Clean Air Act of 1970 required EPA to develop "primary" and
"secondary" ambient air quality standards. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (Supp. 1970), now codified at
42 U.S.C. § 7409 (Supp. II 1978). Primary standards are those deemed necessary to protect
human health with an "adequate" margin of safety. Id. at § 7409(b)(1). Secondary standards
were designed to protect the general public welfare. Id. at § 7409(b)(2). EPA first adopted
standards for total suspended particular matters, sulfur dioxide, and carbon monoxide. 40
C.F.R. § 50.5 to 50.8 (1972). It has now adopted air quality standards for nalious oxides,
hydrocarbons, ozone (oxidants), and lead. 40 C.F.R. Part 50 (1980).
72. Section 110 of the Air Act required states to submit plans to meet the federal ambient air quality standards, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(6)(Supp. III 1979). States were free to adopt
whatever mix of control requirements they chose. Train v. National Resources Defense
Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975). EPA's function was simply to review those plans for their adequacy to "attain and maintain" those standards. Union Electric v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246
(1976). The first set of implementation plans were approved May 31, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg.
10847, 10905 (1972).
73. The first new source performance standards were adopted in 1971, but major portions of these regulations were overturned as being inconsistent with statutory intent. E.g.,
Portland Cement Assoc. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 921 (1974).
74. See generally notes 103-08 infra and accompanying text. Prior to enactment of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, the federal Solid Waste Disposal Act provided for research grants and grants to state and local government for their own pollution
control programs. 42 U.S.C. § 3251 et seq. (1975).
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discharges, 7 begun in April, 1971, had been enjoined by January,

1972.76 Different versions of bills that were to become the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 had just passed
the Senate and the House." Perhaps most importantly, there were
no federal statutes or regulations which provided a federal procedure or rule of decision for complaints by one state for pollution
originating without its borders. It was in this context that the Supreme Court placed its imprimatur upon federal common law
nuisance.
The major overhaul of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
six months after Illinois v. Milwaukee"6 was decided is only one
example of the substantive environmental legislation enacted by
Congress in the 1970's. In 1972, administation of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act was transferred from the
Department of Agriculture to the EPA and that agency was given
additional power to regulate pesticide use.7 0 The Solid Waste Disposal Act was rewritten and renamed the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act in 1976, resulting in a program for control of
hazardous chemicals from their creation to their ultimate disposal.80 The same year, Congress passed the Toxic Substances Control Act, which gave the EPA authority to control or prohibit the
manufacture, processing and distribution of new chemicals and to
regulate the use, storage and disposal of existing toxic substances."'
The next year, Congress adopted relatively minor "mid-course corrections" to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and renamed
it the Clean Water Act.8 2 Congress also took action to modify and
authorize previously disputed regulations controlling the construction of new manufacturing facilities, as well as making other
75. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976). This provision, known as Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbor
Act of 1899, was fashioned by the Supreme Court into a pollution control statute. See
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966). Regulations for the issuance of permits to control wastewater discharges (from industries but not from municipalities) were not promulgated until April,
1971. 36 Fed. Reg. 6564 et seq. (1971).
76. Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D. D.C. 1971). The court enjoined issuance of permits
for discharges to non-navigable waters. Following that order, however, the program was
halted by the Corps of Engineers.
77. See 1 Legis. Hist., supra note 48, at 343.
78. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
79. Pub. L. 92-516; 7 U.S.C. § 135 et seq. (1976).
80. Pub. L. 94-580; 42 U.S.C. § 6901-29 (1976).
S1. Pub. L. 94-469; 15 U.S.C. § 2601-29 (1976).
82. Pub. L. 95-217, § 2 (1977).
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changes in the Clean Air Act."'
Pursuant to these and other statutes, EPA has proposed and/or
issued an unprecedented number of regulations. Excluding the
state environmental regulations that are also federally enforceable, 84 EPA's own published rules contain nearly as much text as
the rules of the Internal Revenue Service.s5 Indeed, deciphering
EPA's regulations may be to the engineering and biochemical disciplines what decoding the rules of the IRS and SEC is to the accounting profession.
An Overview of Major Federal Pollution Control Statutes
The three major pollution control statutes are the Clean Air Act,
83. Pub. L. 95-95 (1977). Under § 110 of the Clean Air Act of 1970, states were required
to submit regulatory plans which would provide for the attainment and maintenance of primary and secondary ambient air quality standards. See note 85 infra. EPA was sued for
failing to require states to include in their plans regulations which would prevent significant
deterioration of air quality in those areas already "cleaner" than the national standards.
The district court agreed and preliminarily enjoined EPA from approving state implementation plans without such regulations. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion, and
that ruling was upheld by an evenly divided Supreme Court, also without opinion. Sierra
Club. v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D. D.C. 1972), aff'd, (D.C. Cir., unpublished order),
aff'd sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973). EPA then proposed and promulgated
such a requirement for state plans. Congress modified the requirements for such "PSD"
regulations in the 1977 Amendments. EPA's regulatory response was again challenged. Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Alabama Power Co. v.
Costle, 606 F.2d 1068 (preliminary memorandum opinion), 13 E.R.C. 1993 (final opinion)
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
84. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C), 1313(b) (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (Supp. II 1978).
85. EPA rules include: (1) air and water pollution standards requiring removal of pollutants from stacks and wastewater pipes, e.g., 40 C.F.R. Part 60, Part 408, Subpart A (1980);
(2) the means of disposing of solid wastes, including the waste removed from the stacks and
pipes, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 261.31 (1980) (dewatered air pollution control sludges from coke
ovens and blast furnaces), 262.20(b)(1980) (manifest to designate disposal site), Part 265,
subpart N (landfill standards), 45 Fed. Reg. at 33123, 33143, 33249 (1980); and (3) controls
on the development of new products and new manufacturing plants, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
2604(a)(1976); 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.18(j), 52.24 (1980), 45 Fed. Reg. at 52729-48 (1980). 33 U.S.C.
§ 1371(c) (1976) also makes the National Environmental Policy Act applicable to issuance of
NPDES permits to new sources.
In the most recent edition of the Code of Federal Regulations which contains a complete
set of EPA's regulations, EPA regulations (40 C.F.R. Parts 1-799) occupied 4,675 pages and
IRS regulations (26 C.F.R. Part 1 to end) occupied 7,121 pages. Since then, EPA has
adopted several significant and complex regulations, including its consolidated permit review rules, economic penalty policy, and hazardous waste rules. 45 Fed. Reg. 33418-33512,
50110-21, and 33066-33278 (1980). Air regulations under state implementation plans and
state discharge regulations, which are also federally enforceable, add to the tally of EPA
rules. Further, while EPA has not yet developed a comprehensive set of agency law like the
IRS has with its revenue rulings and private letters, decisions of the EPA General Counsel
and Administrator and the technical guidance documents published by EPA have already
substantially expanded the breadth of agency law.
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the Clean Water Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA). These statutes can best be described by reviewing
their common features and goals."'
(1) Substantive Duties of EPA
Under each of the major federal pollution control statutes, the
Administrator of EPA has significant responsibilities to promulgate nationwide standards for environmental pollution control.
The Clean Water Act requires the Administrator to promulgate
source8 7 performance standards and regulations requiring the use
of "best practicable" and "best available" wastewater treatment
technology by specified dates for 27 separate categories of industrial facilities.8" The Clean Water Act further requires timely issuance of regulations for discharges of toxic pollutants for these and
other industrial categories. 8 The Clean Air Act also requires promulgation of new source performance standards for certain indus86. Particular statutes were selected for discussion because they focus upon the same
type of activities which could become a "nuisance" at common law. These statutes are principally concerned with controlling "pollution," i.e. waste materials from activities like manufacturing and sewage treatment, which may be emitted into the air, discharged into surface
waters, or deposited in or on land. Other statutes which also directly or indirectly affect
environmental protection issues are not considered here.
87. A "source" or "point source" is defined in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, ..
from which
pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1980).
88. See National Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A), (b)(2), 1316 (Supp. IV 1974). A series of cases developed the meaning of the "best practicable" and "best available" treatment requirements. See E.I. duPont
de Nemours Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977), and cases cited therein.
89. Pub. L. 95-217, § 53; 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979). These regulations were
to be adopted based upon the age and manufacturing process of the equipment and facilities
involved, engineering aspects of wastewater treatment and process changes, the costs of the
regulations, and the impact of the requirements upon other environmental media. 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1314(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B) (1976). Only in the situations of toxic pollutant effluent standards or failure of a receiving stream to meet water quality standards were economic and
engineering issues not determinative for the statutory requirements. 33 U.S.C. §§
1311(b)(1)(C), 1312, 1317 (Supp. IV 1974). See also United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556
F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977), which held, inter alia, sources must meet the statutory timetable
for installation of the necessary technology, and more stringent state requirements were a
matter for state agencies, not the EPA. The courts also have made clear that the individual
circumstances of each plant should be considered. If a plant was found to be fundamentally
different from the typical plant, a variance could be granted. E.I. duPont de Nemours Co. v.
Train, 430 U.S. 112, 128 (1977); see also Alton Box Board Co. v. EPA, 592 F.2d 395 (7th Cir.
1979). The Supreme Court has recently decided that individual plant economics cannot be
taken into account to determine if the facility is "fundamentally different" for purposes of
the 1977 BPT regulations. EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Assoc., 49 U.S.L.W. 3175 (1980).
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tries.90 The Act authorizes EPA to formulate national emission
standards to control hazardous air pollutants."1 So long as feasible,
these standards must provide
an "ample margin of safety to pro92
tect the public health.

Similarly, the RCRA prescribes administrative rules for recordkeeping, labeling, transporting and storing hazardous wastes.93 The
statute further requires assurances of the financial responsibility of
disposers of hazardous wastes. This is to be measured by the degree and duration of the risks associated with the treatment, storage or disposal activity."
(2)

Control Over Industrial and Municipal Pollution Sources

Each of the environmental statutes contains one or more mecha90. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp. III 1979). These standards are required to be based upon the
feasibility of using stack treatment equipment, its cost, and whether regulation would cause
pollution of another environmental media such as land. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a) (Supp. II 1978);
Portland Cement Assoc. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 921 (1974).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. 111978). A hazardous air pollutant is defined by § 7412(a)(1)
as:
[Ain air pollutant to which no ambient air quality standard is applicable and
which in the judgment of the Administrator causes, or contributes to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to result in an increase in mortality or an
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1976). If it is not "feasible" to prescribe an emission standard, the Administrator may require a "design, equipment, work practice or operational
standard," which, in his judgment, will adequately protect the public health. The phrase
"not feasible" means:
[A]ny situation in which the Administrator determines that (A) a hazardous pollutant or pollutants cannot be emitted through a conveyance designed and constructed to emit or capture such pollutant, or that any requirement for, or use of,
such a conveyance would be inconsistent with any Federal, State or local law, or
(B) the application of measurement methodology to a particular class of sources is
not practicable due to technological or economic limitations.
42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(Supp. 11 1978).
93. Generators of hazardous wastes are subject to recordkeeping, labeling and disclosure
rules and are required to use appropriate containers and prepare a "manifest" to permit the
tracking of the waste. 42 U.S.C. § 6922 (Supp. II 1978). See text accompanying notes 103-08
infra. Transporters must also keep records, handle only properly labeled wastes, and transport the waste only to the disposal site designated on the manifest. 42 U.S.C. § 6923(a)(4)
(Supp. II 1978). Persons who treat, store or dispose of hazardous waste must apply for and
receive a permit. 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (Supp. 11 1978). See text accompanying note 107 infra.
They must also meet construction, operating and closure requirements "necessary to protect
human health and environment." 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1976).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(6) (1976). EPA regulations require that a fund be established sufficient to assure proper closure of active sites. When a site is closed, provision must be made
for supervision of the closed site for an additional thirty years. 45 Fed. Reg. 33243-44,
33265-78 (1980).
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nisms for controlling industrial and municipal activities which may
cause pollution. The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) was created by the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972." NPDES permits transform the
general requirements of the Act and final EPA regulations into individual requirements." Every point source which discharges pollutants into navigable waters must apply for and receive a permit.- ' Publicly-owned treatment works must install secondary
treatment and "best practicable waste treatment" technology for
the life of the works."
The Clean Air Act regulates new and existing sources of emissions in a different way. Existing sources, to the extent they can be
controlled, are generally subject only to requirements promulgated
by the states and submitted to EPA for approval. 9" Once these
state implementation plans are approved, these requirements become enforceable under federal law.10 0 New, reconstructed, and
modified sources must meet EPA standards for emissions control."'1 New or significantly modified sources, whether in "clean-

95. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 402(a), (b) (1973), 86 Stat. 880, 881, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a), (b)
(Supp. IV 1974). Secton 402(a) governs the issuance of NPDES permits by EPA, while §
402(b) identifies the necessary elements of an appropriate state program to issue NPDES
permits. See text accompanying note 128 infra. Among the more important of these elements is the issuance of permits which assume compliance with the effluent limitations required by section 301, including those more stringent effluent limitations necessary to meet
water quality standards established under state law. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b)(1)(A),
1311(b)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1974). See note 110 infra. State programs must also assure that
adjoining states whose waters may be affected by a proposed permit receive notice and an
opportunity to comment. Id. at §§ 1342(b)(3), (5). Notice of a proposed permit and of the
reasons for not accepting more stringent limitations requested by an adjoining state must be
given to U.S. EPA. Id. at §§ 1342(b)(4), (5). Of course, the governor of the adjoining state
may sue the Administrator if the Administrator fails to enforce a limitation necessary to
protect that state's public health or water quality standard. Id. at § 1365(h). For a discussion of the effect of an NPDES permit upon pollution claims arising under state law, see
Bernbom, The National Permit Program: A Polluter's Bridge Over Troubled Waters?, 7
Loy. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1976).
96. EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200 (1976). E.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253
(9th Cir. 1977); United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977).
97. EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976).
98. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(B), 1311(i)(1), 1281(g)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1974).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979). The 1977 Amendments, however, require
state regulations to provide for installation of "reasonably available control technology" at
existing sources in areas of the state where national ambient air quality standards are not
being achieved. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(I) (Supp. 11 1978).
100. E.g., Illinois v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 490 F. Supp. 1145 (N.D. 11. 1980). All
sources of hazardous air pollutants subject to standards adopted by EPA are, of course,
subject to site-specific enforcement.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (Supp. III 1979). In addition, EPA has authority to seek imme-
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air" or "dirty-air" areas, must be subject to special scrutiny.' 2
Under the RCRA there are two systems which effect individualized controls. One system regulates the conduct of persons who
handle hazardous waste material.'0 3 Hazardous waste must be
identified as hazardous on a "manifest form" and must be packaged and labeled in an appropriate manner.0 The manifest requires carriers to take the waste only to the facility identified on
the form.10 5 The person who treats, stores or disposes of the waste
must acknowledge receipt and return a copy of the manifest form
to the generator. ' " A second system of regulation is imposed on all
treaters, storers, or disposers of hazardous waste. These persons,
whether industrial or municipal, must apply for and receive a permit to carry on their operations1 0 and must comply with detailed
operations standards and other precautions established by EPA.
Among other requirements, disposers must install appropriate
monitoring equipment and also must prevent unauthorizd access
to the site.1 08
(3)

Certainty and Finality of Pollution Controls

The specific conduct regulations and the permit processes make
clear what each pollution source must do to meet congressional
diate judicial relief to abate a situation which endangers human health. Id. at § 7603(a).
Similar authority exists under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (1976), and RCRA, 42
U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. III 1979). These ample EPA remedies contrast sharply with the procedures mandated by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1970. That Act called for
conferences between the Federal Water Pollution Control Administrator, the alleged source
of the water pollution and the affected state(s). A judicial action could be brought only if
this conciliation process failed. In fact, only a few cases were ever brought under the statute.
In contrast, since the adoption of the Clean Water Act more cases have been brought by
each of several "citizens" under 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976) (and other "citizen suits" authorities) than were brought by the federal government under the statute as it existed prior to
1972.
102. Through July 1, 1980, 30 types of effluent manufacturing processes were subject to
these regulations. 40 C.F.R. Part 60 (1980). Among the regulated sources are municipal
sludge incinerators. 40 C.F.R. Part 60, Subpart 0 (1980).
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922(5), 6923(a)(2)(6), 6924(2) (1976).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 6922 (1976).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 6923(a)(4) (1976); 45 Fed. Reg. 33151-52 (1980); 40 C.F.R. Part 263
(1980).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(1)(2) (1976); 45 Fed. Reg. 33221 (1980); 40 C.F.R. Parts 264, 265
(1980).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) (1976). Upon the timely filing of a permit application, the handler assumes "interim status" as a permitted facility and must comply with interim standards promulgated at 40 C.F.R. Part 265 (1980). See 45 Fed. Reg. at 33233 (1980); 40 C.F.R.
§ 265.1(b)(1980).
108. 40 C.F.R. Part 265, Subpart F (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 33239-40 (1980).
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and administrative standards.' 0 ' This insures a significant measure
of certainty in environmental protection."' That certainty is buttressed by a key feature of the statutes, which largely insulates the
validity of these requirements from later challenges. Section 307(b)
of the Clean Air Act,"' Section 509(b) of the Clean Water Act,""
and Section 7006 of RCRA"' all provide for immediate challenge
in any federal court of appeals of new rules or newly-issued permits. This provision requires prompt challenge to environmental
standards, because any administrative action which can be immediately challenged cannot later be attacked." 4 This rule applies to
industry and "environmental" challenges alike. 1 The Clean Water
Act in addition contains a special provision, Section 402(k), 1 6
under which compliance with the terms of a permit is deemed to
be compliance with the key sections of the statute in any enforcement action brought by EPA or by a citizen. This provision is
7
designed to protect the discharger."

In allowing citizens to enforce established effluent limitations,
Congress intended to encourage public participation in administrative processes. Congress did not intend that citizens enforce a
"common law standard of acceptable water quality.""' This policy
is clearly evident in provisions of the Clean Air Act and RCRA as
well. " ' Citizens are permitted to participate in the development of
EPA's rules and to enforce final requirements, but they are not to
sue in federal court to prohibit "pollution" in the absence of ad109. Indeed, this function of the permit is a key reason courts have held that a permit
must be obtained. National Resource Defense Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Alton Box Board v. EPA, 592 F.2d 395, 399 n.8 (7th Cir. 1979).
110. See EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976); E.I. duPont de Nemours Co. v.
Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 n.28 (1977).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 7807(b)(1) (1980).
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1979).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 6976 (1976).
114. In Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978), the Court upheld the
constitutionality of this provision in a criminal prosecution.
115. Id. at 285. See also City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 697 (7th Cir.
1975).
116. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (1976).
117. E. I. duPont de Nemours Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 n.28 (1977).
118. 2 Legis. Hist., supra note 48, at 1497.
119. As does § 505 of the Clean Water Act, § 304 of the Clean Air Act and § 7002 of
RCRA permit citizen participation in the development and enforcement of EPA standards
for pollution control. 42 U.S.C. § 7804(a) (1979). RCRA, like the Toxic Substances Control
Act, expressly permits citizens and industry to petition EPA to begin rulemaking under the
Act. 42 U.S.C. § 6974(a) (1976), 15 U.S.C. § 2620(a) (1976). Final EPA action is judicially
reviewable. 15 U.S.C. § 2620(b)(4) (1976), 42 U.S.C. § 6976 (1976).
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0

Enforcement

The finality and certainty of administrative standards are
equally important from a pragmatic enforcement perspective.2 "
The EPA, the states and private citizens have direct rights of action under the statutes against persons who are not in compliance
with environmental regulations. Section 304 of the Clean Air
Act,12 2 Section 505 of the Clean Water Act,' 13 and Section 7002 of
RCRA2 contain nearly identical procedures for citizen enforcement. Upon sixty days' notice, a citizen can file suit in federal
court against any person allegedly in violation of the statute or of
its implementing regulations, regardless of the amount in controversy. An action may be brought against the Administrator of EPA
for failure to perform any nondiscretionary duty imposed upon
him by statute.' 2 5 Citizen groups have brought suit to force EPA to
take Action, often under direct court supervision. Each statute also
authorizes an award of attorney's fees in appropriate
6
circumstances. 1
(5)

State Programs and Federal Overview

Another key feature of these statutes is their approach to federal-state relations. The Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act contain nearly identical precatory language: "It is the policy of the
120. "Pollution" should be distinguished from a release of "pollutants" or contaminants
into the environment. Pollution is a legal conclusion that the natural state of particular air,
land or water has been affected so as to cause a nuisance or an injury to the public health or
welfare. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 111 1/2, § 1003(b) (1979) (definition of air pollution), §
1003(hh) (1979) (definition of water pollution). A release of pollutants may cause no harm,
or even be inconsequential to natural conditions.
121. Indeed, the Supreme Court's immediate observation on the NPDES permit system
was that it facilitates enforcement. EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976). The Seventh
Circuit has held that EPA can establish administrative standards in its permitting process,
even if it has not promulgated general standards for the industrial category involved. United
States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 7804 (Supp. III 1979).
123. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. I 1976).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1976).
125. E.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 8 E.R.C. 2120, 2129 (D. D.C.
1975) (promulgation of effluent limitation for toxic pollutants); State of Illinois v. Costle, 12
E.R.C. 1597 (D. D.C. 1979) (promulgation of performance standards under RCRA). This
provision has even been applied to petitions to review EPA regulations. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973); but see, N.R.D.C. v. EPA,
539 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1976); N.R.D.C. v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
126. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(e), 7604(d) (1976).
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Congress to recognize, preserve and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of State to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution .... ",127 All three Acts allow states to enforce their own standards, but only if they are as stringent as, or more stringent than,
EPA requirements.
Each statute allows for various state programs to carry out federal standards. Under the Clean Water Act, the Administrator
must delegate to a requesting state the primary authority to issue
NPDES permits, if the state submits an adequate program. 2 8
States are also required to submit plans to attain water quality
standards,1 2 ' to restore public fresh water lakes, 30 and to monitor
future growth. 3 1 EPA must reject state water quality standards
that do not meet congressional criteria. If the state fails to correct
the deficiency, EPA must promulgate federal water quality
3 2
standards.1
State Implementation Plans are required under the Clean Air
Act. EPA must approve a state plan if it is adequate to attain and
maintain national ambient air quality standards. 33 Upon approval,
EPA can delegate to the state primary responsibility for permit
issuance and enforcement of hazardous air pollutant and new
source standards. 13 4 Similarly, under the RCRA, EPA must delegate primary enforcement responsibility upon approval of an ade-

127. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. 11 1976). Also section 101(a)(3) of the Clean Air Act
states: "the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility
of states and local government." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (Supp. II 1976). Similarly, the
RCRA recognizes that collection and disposal of solid wastes must continue to be primarily
a function of the state. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(4) (1976).
128. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (Supp. 111978). One of the most debated issues in adopting the
1972 Amendments was the proper relationship between the state and federal governments.
The House bill would have allowed more autonomy to the states, while the Senate bill required EPA approval of each permit. 1 Legis. Hist., supra note 48, at 176, 321-22. The
compromise provided for state approval of a permit issued by EPA (33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)
(Supp. II 1978)), required EPA to delegate permit-issuing authority to states with adequate
programs (33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (Supp. II 1978)), and allowed EPA to object to a state-proposed permit only if the permit was inconsistent with guidelines developed under the Act.
(33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (Supp. IV 1974)). See Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 567 F.2d 661 (6th Cir.
1977).
129. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976).
130. 33 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1976).
131. 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b) (1976). This section commands regional and statewide land use
plans, commonly known as 208 plans.
132. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (Supp. 11 1978).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (Supp. III 1979). See Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Train, 421 U.S. 60 (1975); Union Electric v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
134. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(c), 7412(d) (Supp. II 1978).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 12

quate state plan. 3 5

The statutes also contain provisions to prevent one state's pollutants from injuring neighboring states. First, EPA can delegate authority only if the state program is adequate.' The statutes provide for immediate judicial review of EPA approval of state
programs at the request of a complaining state.13 7 The Administrator is required to give public notice of a plan deficiency if it is not
promptly corrected. 3 8 Second, EPA may also revoke a state's authority to carry on a federal statutory program.3 9 Third, the Clean
Air and Clean Water Acts permit EPA, at the request of a complaining state, to determine whether actions in another state are
violating the air or water quality standards of the complaining
state. Under section 126(c) of the Air Act, 4 ° a state may petition
the Administrator for a finding that a new or existing statutory
source prevents the attainment or maintenance of national ambient air quality standards.'" While EPA's determination may not
necessarily be reviewable by the court of appeals, it could be reviewable if published in the Federal Register. 4 " In any event, EPA
action would be subject to the Administrative Review Act. 43 The

135. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1976). States are prohibited from imposing requirements less
stringent than RCRA regulations adopted by EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1976). RCRA provides
for a state to assume interim or temporary authority for issuing RCRA permits and enforcing the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1976).
136. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1976); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a), 6926 (1976). Delegation of authority to a state program may be ineffective to prevent pollution of neighbor states if EPA's
guidelines are deficient. This happened to Illinois' NPDES program. Citizens for a Better
Environment v. EPA, 596 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1979).
137. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(E) (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 7407(b)(1) (Supp. II 1978); 42 U.S.C. §
7413(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1978); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b)(2) (1976).
138. Id.
139. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(2)(3) (1976) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (1976)
(RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5) (Supp. 11 1978) (Clean Air Act).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 7426(c) (Supp. 11 1978).
141. The Administrator must hold a public hearing and make a determination within 60
days. If an affirmative determination is made, the new source cannot be built: an existing
source that continues operations will be presumed in violation of the local state implementation plan. 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (Supp. II 1978).
142. Although § 126(c) is not among the sections listed in § 307(b)(1), an EPA determination could fall into the catch-all provision and, if published in the Federal Register, be
immediately reviewable. See Harrison v. PPG Indus., 100 S.Ct. 1889 (1980).
143. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976) makes reviewable any final agency actions and authorizes a court to set aside any action that is arbitrary, capricious or not in accordance with
law. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). Should the determination be a decision on a license under § 558
(c) or an adjudication under § 554, the decision may be set aside if not supported by substantial evidence. See Marathon Oil Company v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 556 F.2d 822, 833 (7th Cir. 1977).
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Clean Water Act accomplishes the same result via the NPDES system. Notice of the proposed issuance of each permit"" and an opportunity to comment 145 must be given to all states whose water
"may be affected." If the issuing state rejects the comments, EPA
may impose its own permit requirements, subject to an administrative hearing.146 The Clean Water Act also allows an aggrieved state
to bring a direct action against the Administrator for failure to enforce federal or state discharge requirements in a neighboring

state. 147 Thus, the legislative framework permits one state to insist
that a neighboring state respect the first state's water quality
4 8
standards.

144. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3) (1976).
145. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(5) (1976).
146. When the issuing state refuses to accept other states' comments, it must explain its
reasons to those states, as well as to the Administrator. 40 C.F.R. § 123.23(b)(2) (1979); 40
C.F.R. 123.75 (c)(2) (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 33471 (1980); 123 CONG. REc. H12,934 (December
15, 1977). The Administrator may object to the state's plan, pursuant to § 402(d), as being
outside the guidelines of the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(1) (1976). The issuing state may either
amend its plan to conform to the objections, or request a hearing. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)
(1976). If, after the hearing, the EPA endorses the issuing state's plan, EPA will issue its
own permit. The commenting states may then seek judicial review. 33 U.S.C. § 1369
(b)(1)(F) (1976). If the Administrator fails to object to the state's plan, this inaction may
also be challenged by the commenting states. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(h) (1976). See also note 118
supra. Although the Seventh Circuit noted this provision, it apparently failed to recognize
the inclusion of § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1976). Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 160 (7th Cir.
1979). Several courts have held that citizens may not seek review in the court of appeals
when EPA fails to veto a state permit. Save the Bay, Inc. v. EPA, 556 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir.
1977); Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978). States have a special right to
challenge EPA for failing to object by suing in district court. Compare District of Columbia
v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 15 E.R.C. 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1980), where the court held that the
District of Columbia could not sue EPA for failing to object to an NPDES permit issued by
Maryland. The court did not, however, discuss 33 U.S.C. § 1365(h) (1976). But the court did
conclude there had been no showing of an injury to the District of Columbia. Id. at 1110.
That conclusion may have negated a claim under § 1365(h).
147. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(0, 1311(b)(1)(C) (1976). Compare Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S.
91, 107 (1972). Of course, if an imminent or substantial danger to human health or the
environment exists, EPA can sue immediately to enjoin the hazard. 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (1976);
42 U.S.C. §§ 6973, 7603 (Supp. II 1978).
148. In fact, in the eight years since the 1972 decision, Illinois could have utilized these
provisions to force Milwaukee to institute better sewage and stormwater treatment. Illinois
had at least four opportunities to be heard with respect to wastewater discharges from the
City of Milwaukee: (1) Under § 505 of the Act, a suit could have been brought after July 1,
1973, alleging that Milwaukee's discharges were injuring Illinois waters, 33 U.S.C. § 1365
(a)(1) (1976); (2) the Administrator of EPA could have been sued directly and immediately
for not taking action to halt this alleged injury, id. at § 1365(h); (3) Illinois could have
objected to EPA's delegation to the State of Wisconsin the authority to issue NPDES permits and appealed an adverse decision directly to the Court of Appeals, id. at §
1369(b)(1)(D). If the EPA had issued the Milwaukee permit, a similar right of appeal would
have existed, id. at § 1369(b)(1)(F); (4) Illinois could have commented on the permit pro-
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This overview of the three major pollution control statutes enacted since the 1972 Illinois v. Milwaukee decision clearly illustrates the comprehensive scheme Congress created to regulate uses
and misuses of the environment. Yet, in 1979, the Seventh Circuit
believed that somewhere in this legislative labyrinth of environmental control federal common law nuisance still had a niche.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND COMMON LAW: THE SEVENTH

CIRCUIT DECISION

The Seventh Circuit's decision that the 1972 and 1977 amendments of the Clean Water Act did not preempt federal common
law nuisance rested upon an examination of three sections of the
Act: sections 505(e) 149 510,150 and 511(a). 5 1 In these provisions, the
court found evidence of congressional intent to preserve federal
common law nuisance. 15 An analysis of these sections will reveal
the limitations of the court's reasoning.
Section 511(a)
Section 511(a) of the Clean Water Act addresses the question of
what governmental authority is affected by the new amendments.
It provides that the Act "shall not be construed as (1) limiting the
authority or functions of any officer or agency of the United States
under any other law or regulation not inconsistent with this chapter.' 5 The Seventh Circuit found this language "arguably broad
enough to include the federal courts."'" For this provision to be
construed to include the authority of the federal judiciary under
federal common law, however, "officer" would have to mean
"judge," and "agency" would have to include "the courts." It is
much more reasonable, however, to construe these two words to
have their plain meaning: a federal "official" of an administrative

posed by Wisconsin and demanded the EPA to veto the state proposed permit and itself
issue an appropriate permit, including a recognition of Illinois standards, under §
301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C)(1976). Had EPA refused, that action would have
been reviewable. Moreover, the latter right accrues at least every five years, since that is the
maximum time period for an NPDES permit. Instead, Illinois persisted in its federal nuisance action.
149. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976).
150. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976).
151. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1976).
152. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 162-63 (7th Cir. 1979).
153. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
154. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 162 (7th Cir. 1979).
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"agency." ' In other parts of the Act, Congress specifically identified judges and courts when it intended a particular provision to
reach them. 15 Furthermore, the phrase "other law or regulations"
does not seem intended to include federal common law. Courts do
not issue regulations to implement their "law."
17
Almost identical language is found in section 301(b)(1)(c),
which prescribes adoption of effluent limitations. Section
301(b)(1)(c) requires compliance by July 1, 1977, with effluent limitations established pursuant to state law or "any other Federal
law or regulation.' ' 5 8 If this language includes federal common law,
such a construction would mean that compliance with judicially
mandated effluent limitations under federal nuisance law was legislatively postponed until July 1, 1977, and that EPA could extend
the dates for some dischargers until 1983. 15 Federal common law
has no logical place in section 301(b)(1)(c). There is, therefore, no
reason to assume that the almost identical language of section
511(a) should encompass federal common law.
Section 510
The Seventh Circuit also read section 511(a) in light of the policies expressed in section 510, and found that section 510 of the Act
further supported the determination that Congress did not intend
to preempt federal common law nuisance. '0 Section 510 provides
that nothing in the Act precludes a state from adopting and enforcing its own effluent limitations, so long as they are not less
stringent than federal requirements.' 6 ' This was proof, the court
155. Other provisions of the Act use the concept of "officers" of the United States. 33
U.S.C. §§ 1363(a)(2)(B), 1322 (1976). The usage in these sections clearly contemplates administrative officers, including persons to advise EPA and the Congress on scientific matters
involving environmental control.
156. District courts are identified as having certain roles in §§ 309, 504, 505 and 509(a),
principally to enforce the provisions of the Act. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1364, 1365 (1976). Courts
of appeal are also given jurisdiction to review certain administrative actions in § 509(b). 33
U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1976).
157. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1976).
158. Id.
159. In 1977, Congress authorized EPA to postpone compliance with the § 301(b)(1) requirements for those municipalities and industries who could not comply due to EPA's failure to timely provide federal construction grant funds. See Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 45, 33
U.S.C. § 1311(i) (1976). Thus, if federal law in § 301(b)(1)(C) included federal common law,
Congress would have delayed the effectiveness of any effluent limitations until July 1, 1977
and allowed EPA to extend the timetable up to an additional six years. This absurd construction inexorably follows from the Seventh Circuit's analysis of § 511.
160. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 162 (7th Cir. 1979).
161. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976).
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found, that regulatory uniformity was not a congressional goal.
Thus, differences among federal standards were also appropriate.
Stricter effluent limitations pursuant to federal common law could
coexist alongside more lenient EPA requirements.16
Reliance upon section 510 to support the preservation of federal
nuisance law is particularly inappropriate, however, in light of the
Seventh Circuit's ruling on Illinois' state law claim. The court rejected Illinois' claim based upon state pollution regulations, holding that federal common law, and not state statutory or common
law, controlled this case. 1" This result strongly suggests that state
standards must defer to federal common law standards when an
interstate body of water is involved. Such a view is directly contradicted by the express language of section 510, which requires state
effluent limitations to defer to EPA requirements when state standards are less stringent, but demands no deference to judiciallycreated standards.'" Moreover, section 505 of the Act encourages
states to maintain their own, higher water quality standards. If
federal common law of nuisance can replace state law, but the Act

162. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 162 (7th Cir. 1979).
163. Id. at 177 n.53.
164. Section 510 proscribes state standards that are less stringent than "an effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance. . . in effect under this Act." 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976). Section 502(11)
defines "effluent limitations" as "any reduction established by a State or the Administrator
on quantities, rates and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological and other constituents which are discharged from point sources into navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, or the ocean, including schedules of compliance." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (1976).
(emphasis added). As noted above, federal common law does not fit into § 301(b)(1)(C), nor
does the Act create limitations based on federal common law. Further, EPA is authorized to
establish limitations under §§ 301, 302 and 307 of the Act. See E.I. duPont de Nemours Co.
v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). Section 307 also authorizes EPA to adopt "effluent standard[s], prohibition[s] [and] pretreatment standard[s]." 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(b)(c) (1976).
"Standard[s] of performance" required for new sources are governed by § 306. 33 U.S.C. §
1316 (1976). See also E.I. duPont de Nemours Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977), for a discussion of the significance of the word "standard," as opposed to "limitation," in the Act.
Both standards and limitations are set by the Administrator of EPA. Limitations can be
adjusted for site-specific reasons, standards cannot. Nowhere does § 510 identify any judgemade or common law rule to which state standards must defer.
The environmental bar and state agencies have always considered § 510 as authorization
for state regulations which defer only requirements set by EPA. For example, the Illinois
Pollution Control Board has described its authority in terms of federal regulations, holding
that if the requirements imposed by EPA are uncertain, the state is free to regulate as is
appropriate in individual circumstances. B.F. Goodrich v. Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency, Illinois Pollution Control Board 77-155, 2 (September 29, 1977). See also KisSEL,
RussELL & FORT, WATER POLLUTION 6-73 to 6-74 (IICLE Environmental Law Handbook,
1978). Provisions similar to § 510 also exist in the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1976))
and RCRA (42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1976)).
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expressly authorizes state law in section 510, surely section 510 can
lend no support to the preservation of federal common law
nuisance.
Section 505(e)
Finally, the court cited section 505(e) of the Act to illustrate
congressional intent to retain federal common law nuisance. Section 505(e) establishes jurisdiction in the federal district courts,
without regard to the amount in controversy, of suits by private
citizens to enforce effluent limitations under the Act.1" Section
505(e) specifically provides that "[n]othing in this section shall restrict any right which any person. . . may have under any statute
or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or
limitation or to seek other relief." 166 The court held that the words
"any statute or common law" include not only state common law,
167
but federal common law as well.
There are three possible interpretations of section 505(3). First,
by inserting the phrase "any statute or common law," Congress intended to affirmatively preserve federal common law nuisance.
This is the Seventh Circuit's view. Alternatively, by including the
words "enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation," Congress intended to limit actions under other statutes and common
law to actions for enforcement. This would preclude actions for
separate claims arising under federal common law nuisance. A final
alternative is that Congress merely intended this provision to create a special basis of jurisdiction in the federal district courts for
specific enforcement claims under the Act, but neither provided
for, nor rejected, other existing remedies. This interpretation is
most likely in light of the history of section 505(e) and the purposes of the Act.
There is strong evidence in the legislative history that section
505(e) was not an affirmation of judge-made standards for pollution control under federal common law nuisance. Congress stated
very plainly that in citizen suits under section 505 to enforce efflu-

165. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976). Subsection (b) imposes limitations upon these citizens
suits to "carefully channel public participation," Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling
Corp., 604 F.2d 1008, 1015 (7th Cir. 1979). Venue and EPA intervention are governed by
subsection (c) and attorney's fees are authorized by subsection (d). A "citizen" is defined
under subsection (g) as "a person or persons having an interest or interests which is or may
be adversely affected." 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976).
166. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976).
167. Illinoi; v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 163 (7th Cir. 1979).
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ent limitations, the courts were not to "substitute a 'common law'
or court-developed definition of water quality" for the guidelines
painstakingly prepared by administrative procedures. 1 8 Instead,
citizens would have an opportunity to participate in the administrative process to develop meaningful standards.' 9 Citizen participation early in the regulatory process would eliminate the need for
judicial re-evaluation at the enforcement stage. The legislative history of the Act reveals congressional preference for effluent stan-

dards developed by thorough administrative research as opposed
to court-made standards. Moreover, language identical to section
505(e) appears in section 304(d) of the Clean Air Act, 70 which was
enacted over a year before the Supreme Court formally recognized
federal common law nuisance. 7 1 In light of these facts, it is unlikely that Congress specifically endorsed federal nuisance by inserting section 505(e).
On the other hand, it is probably equally unlikely that section
505(e) was meant to limit all remedies to causes of action for unlawful discharges as defined by the Act. Arguably, such an approach might be consistent with the clear congressional policy to
control pollution at the point of discharge by requiring compliance
with the Act at the outset.17 Damage actions for past violations
are not nearly as effective in preventing actual injury to the environment.1 7 8 However, this ignores the final phrase in section

168. 2 Legis. Hist., supra note 54, at 1497; S. REP. No. 92-414, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 79
(1971).
169. Id. See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (Supp. II 1978).
171. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). The Clean Air Act became law on December 31, 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-604.
172. The legislative history of the 1972 Amendments discloses an intent that discharge
which exceeded allowable levels be promptly halted and that prompt enforcement action be
taken. 1 Legis. Hist., supra note 48, at 174. Indeed, the 1972 Amendments allowed EPA to
issue only administrative orders which required compliance within 30 days. 33 U.S.C. §
1319(a) (1976). The Clean Water Act also provides for civil penalties up to $100,000 per day
for violations of permit requirements or effluent limitations under the Act. 33 U.S.C. §
1319(d) (1976).
173. Compare Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling Corp., 604 F.2d 1008, 1014 (7th
Cir. 1979) with Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623, 631 (7th Cir. 1980). In
Evansville, the court refused to imply a private cause of action in part because § 505 was
viewed as not applying to past violations. But, in Outboard Marine, the court decided that
the Illinois Attorney General could intervene under § 505(b)(1)(B) even if the pending case
did involve only a complaint of past pollution. Past discharges should be distinguished from
recurring "intermittent" discharges. The latter were to be prosecuted. 1 Legis. Hist., supra
note 48, at 174. The former were not. Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling Corp., 604
F.2d 1008, 1014 (7th Cir. 1979).
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505(e): "or to seek other relief.' 7' Congress inserted this language
to preserve private claims for damages due to violations of the
17 5
Act.
The most satisfactory interpretation of section 505(e) is that it
takes no stand on the preemption issue at all.17 1 Section 505 creates a special basis for federal jurisdiction for private enforcement
of the Act. Without section 505(e), an enforcement action might be
construed as the exclusive remedy under the Act. Congress added
section 505(e) to make it clear that private actions for damages
were also permissable. This interpretation of section 505(e) preserves the integrity of the federal pollution control program, yet
comports with other provisions of the Act which encourage state
involvement. It would also preserve suits against the EPA for actions which are arbitrary or inconsistent with statutory intent, but
77
which are not expressly reviewable under the Act.1
If section 505(e) makes no positive or negative statement about
the continued existence of federal common law nuisance, then the
question is left to the federal judiciary for resolution.1 7 The courts

174. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976). See text accompanying note 166 supra.
175. 2 Legis. Hist., supra note 48, at 1497; S. REP. No. 92-414, 92nd Cong. 1st Sess. 79
(1971).
176. While this article urges that basic congressional policies demonstrate the displacement of common law nuisance, one may wonder why Congress did not speak more clearly to
the issue of the continued viability of federal common law nuisance. It is somewhat
presumptious to condemn Congress for not answering the question. The question is no different from any issue of statutory construction and, for federal common law nuisance, more
obscure than most. Indeed, when one considers the frequency that federal-state preemption
is litigated, the rarity of any federal common law rule surely helps explain the lack of an
express statement. But perhaps the real reason is that the nuances of federal common law
and the interrelationship of congressional and federal court powers is not the grist of legislative debate. Even if an erudite legislator or staff person had focused on this issue, it might
well be discarded as an unnecessary complicating factor for passage of substantive legislation. Moreover, in a situation such as this, where the subject matter is traditionally controlled by state law, the federal courts should find express congressional authorization for a
federal common law. Note, Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1512, 1517-18 (1969).
177. Final agency action which is not "committed to agency discretion" by law is reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 13310 (1976).
Califano v. Saunders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
178. The Solicitor General of the United States, in an amicus curiae brief submitted to
the U.S. Supreme Court in the pending Illinois v. Milwaukee appeal, argues that there is
evidence of congressional intent to preserve nuisance in other portions of the legislative
history of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 23-24, No. 79-408. Congressional debates are cited in
which some Congressmen expressed concern over the effect of the 1972 Amendments on a
case pending in the federal courts at that time, Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492
(8th Cir. 1975), which involved a claim under federal common law nuisance. The debates
reveal congressional opinion that the savings clause of the new Act (§ 4) would preserve this
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can find the answer by reviewing the congressional policies which
underlie the comprehensive pollution control statutory structure,
as well as by analyzing judicial policies surrounding the rejection
or preservation of federal common law nuisance. The following two
sections will examine these congressional and judicial policies.
CONGRESSIONAL POLICIES AGAINST FEDERAL NUISANCE

The extensive environmental legislation since 1972, and most
significantly for the imminent Illinois v. Milwaukee appeal, the
wholesale revision of the Clean Water Act, express congressional
policies which contradict the underpinnings of federal common law
nuisance. These policies include: (1) establishment of a complex
17 9
administrative mechanism for setting water pollution controls;
(2) recognition and support for the continued role of the states in
environmental regulation; 8 0 (3) careful limitation of private suits
to enforce the Act. 181 These legislative choices leave no room for
independent, judicially-created environmental standards.
Establishment of the EPA as a central standard-setting author-

claim. The amicus brief offers this as evidence of congressional intent to retain federal common law nuisance. In fact, the legislative history makes clear that the purpose of the savings
clause was to preserve all pending cases, particularly those already filed under the Refuse
Act. See 1 Legis. Hist., supra note 48, at 193, 211. Actually, the closest the debates come to
the question of federal nuisance is a reference by Senator Muskie to preserving suits already
filed under the Refuse Act, Federal Water Pollution Control Act, or "other law." 1 Legis.
Hist., supra note 48, at 211. Yet, at another point, Senator Griffin described the savings
clause as intending to save "enforcement" actions brought under the Refuse Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and any other acts of Congress. Id. at 193.
The other colloquy relied upon by the United States in its amicus brief discloses legislative concern that states' regulations over watercraft bilge tanks not be disrupted. 1 Legis.
Hist., supra note 48, at 676-77. This is a concern that state laws be preserved; it is fundamentally inconsistent with federal common law nuisance, however, which must "govern" a
situation to which it applies. See note 45 supra.
Perhaps because of the paucity of affirmative legislative history in 1972, Illinois, in its
brief to the Supreme Court, has argued that Congress was aware of federal common law
nuisance in 1977 when it again amended the federal Federal Wateral Pollution Control Act
in the Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 95-217. The authority cited by Illinois is a committee
report prepared for the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation (H. Rep. 9535). Illinois argues that because Congress did not act on federal common law nuisance, it
sanctioned its existence. This is a very slender reed. An argument similar to it was recently
rejected in the snail darter case, Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
Furthermore, the 1976 report to Congress cited by Illinois barely mentions federal common
law nuisance and, in fact, focuses on the courts' recognition of state law. It was also written
before the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed the 1972 decisions holding that state law did not govern in a federal nuisance action.
179. See text accompanying notes 87-148 supra.
180. See text accompanying notes 127-148 supra.
181. See text accompanying notes 121-126 supra.
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ity' 82 is convincing evidence that Congress intended to foreclose
court-made pollution control standards. The three major statutes
prescribe deadlines and establish guidelines under which EPA
must promulgate national standards for pollution control.1 83 EPA
regulations are developed in formal and informal rulemaking
processes which include collection of background data and investigation of model facilities. '" Proposed standards are presented for
public comment. As a result of public criticism, EPA may change
or defend its standard.18 5 Citizen groups have employed statutory
provisions 8 6 to compel EPA to fulfill its responsibilities under the
Act. State and federal discharge permits may not be issued without
affording the affected public an opportunity to be heard before the
187
EPA.
The choice of EPA as a forum for deciding what discharges are
appropriate is a significant indicia of congressional preference.
Congress did not want the federal district courts to create common

182. Compliance with EPA regulations, or securing and complying with an NPDES permit, is sufficient to avoid the prohibition against discharge of pollutants in § 301(a) of the
Clean Water Act. Section 301(a) states: "Except as in compliance with this section and sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402 and 404 of this Act, the discharge of any pollutant by any
person shall be unlawful." 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1976). See also Indiana Stream Pollution
Control Board v. United States Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1975); National Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
183. See text accompanying notes 87-126 supra.See also E.I. duPont de Nemours Co. v.
Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
184. For a general description of EPA's unique rule-making process, see KISSEL, RUSSELL
& FORT, WATER POLLUTION 6-60 (IICLE Environmental Law Handbook, 1978).
185. EPA effluent limitations are presumptively applicable to polluters, although they
may be changed to accommodate special local situations. E.I. duPont de Nemours Co. v.
Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
186. For example, in a citizen's suit pursuant to § 505, the court ordered EPA to promulgate rules as expeditiously as possible. National Resource Defense Council v. Train, 510
F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975). This same citizen group forced EPA regulations beyond simply
controlling particular industries to regulating particular pollutants. National Resource Defense Council v. Train, 8 E.R.C. 2120 (D.D.C. 1975). EPA settled the case by agreeing to
regulate 169 "toxic" pollutants from types included in a list of over 250 standard Industrial
Categories. Id. at 2129. The court decree then became part of the 1977 amendments to the
Clean Water Act. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(C) & (D), 1317(a)(1) (Supp. II
1978). See also House Conference Report 95-830, 5; 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4460. In another
challenge, a citizens group forced EPA to regulate by permit nearly all point sources of
pollution. National Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
187. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1976). See United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822
(7th Cir. 1977); Marathon Oil Corp. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977). Any person
claiming to be affected by the permit issued or proposed by EPA may request such a hearing if they raise a material issue of fact. 40 C.F.R. § 125.36(b)(1) (1976); 40 C.F.R. § 124.74
(1980). Appeals from initial determinations lie with the Administrator. 40 C.F.R. § 125.36(n)
(1976); 40 C.F.R. § 124.89-91 (1980).
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law standards of acceptable water quality.1 88 The intent of the pollution statutes was to use administrative procedures to define and
enforce appropriate standards.
The 1972 Amendments to the Clean Water Act also reflect a special concern for state authority.1 89 Congress recognized that pollution control was primarily a state concern. The statutes preserve
and encourage state regulations and standard-setting.1 90 Most significantly, they provide procedures to resolve interstate pollution
disputes.1 91 Federal common law nuisance originally developed to
address these interstate disputes and to prevent the application of
any single state's law to resolve interstate issues. '1 Congress now
has spoken out clearly for a better system, however, in which state
and federal regulations work together to protect the environment.
In this system, federal common law nuisance has no place.
Federal common law nuisance undermines the cohesive regulatory scheme created to enforce the Act and encourages judiciallydeveloped multiple standards.1 9 3 Congress clearly sought to avoid
such a result by imposing certain requirements on private suits
brought under the Act, while preserving private damage remedies
outside of the Act. The citizen suits provision requires a plaintiff
to give sixty days' prior notice to the Administrator, the violator
and the state in which the violation occurs. ' 14 This affords the
EPA an opportunity to compel the violator to comply with discharge requirements. A suit on a federal nuisance claim, on the
other hand, may be initiated without prior notice to anyone.1 9 The

188. See text accompanying note 168 supra.
189. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(3), 1311(b)(1)(C), 1365(h), 1370 (1976). Of course, as implicitly
suggested by Ohio v. Wyandotte, 401 U.S. 493 (1971), if state standards were determinative,
then there would be no substantial federal question and no jurisdiction. Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); Wheedlin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963). It is ironic that
Illinois, an advocate of federal common law nuisance in Illinois v. Milwaukee, is also urging
the Supreme Court to return to Wyandotte and recognize state standards and claims. Brief
for Respondent at 51-64, No. 79-408, This is contrary to the original petition filed in the
Supreme Court in 1971.
190. See notes 127-148 supra and accompanying text.
191. Id. See also text accompanying notes 136-148 supra.
192. See note 45 supra.
193. See text accompanying notes 161-162 supra.
194. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976).
195. It is anomalous that the Seventh Circuit has strictly enforced the limitations on
citizens suits, while expanding rights under federal nuisance. Its decision in City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976), represents one of the most restrictive interpretations and applications of the citizen suit provisions. There, the City of Highland Park had sued the Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency for not adopting and enforcing a transportation control plan for Illinois. The City
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focus of the private suits provision is on enforcement of administrative pollution controls and not on common law standards.""
This policy of limitation on the citizen's right to sue has oddly
enough led the Seventh Circuit, the most liberal interpretor of federal common law nuisance, to refuse to imply a private common
law private right of action for damages under the Clean Water
Act. 197 Thus, a derivative common law tort action for violation of a
federal statute is rejected, despite congressional support for such
actions. 98 In contrast, a very similar tort action for violation of
federal common law is wholeheartedly upheld. Such inconsistency
will exist as long as federal common law nuisance continues to be
recognized.
The concerted congressional activity and persistent congressional concern with environmental matters evinces an underlying
policy of continued legislative presence and statutory development
in this area. A recent example is the "Superfund" legislation. In
1978 Congress was urged to enact a statute "to define liability and
provide compensation for damages from releases of hazardous substances."' 99 Of the proposed statutes, one bill called for strict liability for any person who "released . . . [a] hazardous substance
into the environment," regardless of whether this "release" was authorized by a federal permit.20 0 This suggested liability closely parsought a preliminary injunction to halt construction of a shopping center. The district court
dismissed the case for plaintiffs' failure to give sixty days' prior notice. 374 F. Supp. 758
(N.D. Ill. 1974). The Seventh Circuit affirmed and commented that the district court had no
jurisdiction. 519 F.2d 681, 692 (1975). Had a nuisance action been filed, however, no such
notice would have been necessary. On the issue of citizen suits, see also Commonwealth of
Massachusetts v. United States Veteran's Admin., 41 F.2d 119, 122 (1st Cir. 1976) and cases
discussed therein. As the court there noted, the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air and
Water Acts are identical and decisions under one act are generally applicable to the other.
196. See text accompanying note 118 supra.
197. Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling Corp., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979).
198. See text accompanying notes 174-175 supra.
199. The Superfund Concept: Report of the Interagency Task Force on Compensation
and Liability For Releases of Hazardous Substances, Land and Natural Resources Division,
Department of Justice, at 152. (June, 1979). Hearings were held on the Superfund legislation by at least three different congressional committees: The Senate Committee on Finance
and on Environment and Public Works, the House Ways and Means Committee, and the
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. See 10 BNA Environmental Reporter 181920; 11 BNA Environmental Reporter 227-28, 229, 729-30, 816-17 (1980). The versions first
passed by the House and Senate respectively were floor compromises, not the bills recommended by a committee. See 126 CONG. Rac. H9436-9479 (September 23, 1980); 126 CONG.
Rac. S14,988 (November 24, 1980).
200. S. REP. No. 96-848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 11, 1980). This version of S. 1480, as
reported by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, was criticized by minority Senators as "exceedingly overbroad and brings too wide an array of business under the
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allels the common law nuisance rule of the Seventh Circuit in Illinois v. Milwaukee. 0 1 The bill which passed and became law,
however, expressly refrained from imposing liability on releases
authorized by an NPDES permit or certain other "federally-issued
permit[s]. 2 0 s This bill also adopted the EPA standards already in
effect for spills of oil and hazardous substances. 0° Thus, Congress
considered and rejected a proposed rule that releases of substances
authorized by a federal permit nevertheless could be actionable if
they caused injury to the environment. Obviously, a federal court
should not recognize a common law rule of liability rejected as a
statutory rule by Congress.
Pollution control has become a "political question," '0 just as are
umbrella of engaging in an ultrahazardous activity ...." Id at 120. This version was also
charged as further overloading the federal courts and creating an unnecessary "federal toxic
tort." Statement of Dr. Louis Fernandez on behalf of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, before the Committee of Finance, United States Senate, on S. 1480 at 25-35 (July 11,
1980).
201. The Seventh Circuit's test for a nuisance is whether the activity in question "causes
a significant injury to the legitimate activities of another." Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d
165 (7th Cir. 1979).
202. On December 3, 1980, the House agreed to the compromise bill passed by the Senate on November 24, 1980. 126 CONG. REc. H11,773-11,803 (December 3, 1980); 126 CONG.
REc. S14,988-15,001 (November 24, 1980). The bill passed by the Senate was a floor compromise, combining elements of S.1480, as reported by the Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works, see note 200 supra and H.R. 7020, a floor compromise passed by the
House on September 28, 1980. 126 CONG. Rzc. H9,436-9,479. President Carter signed the
compromise bill on December 11, 1980 as Pub. L. 96-510. 126 CONG. REc. S1,567 (December
11, 1980).
Section 107 of the statute defines the rules of liability. Recovery for costs or damages
from a "federally permitted release" shall be pursuant to existing law in lieu of this section
.... § 107(0); 126
.
CONG. REc. S14,994. A "federally permitted release" is one authorized
by a permit required by federal law, including an NPDES permit. § 101(10)(A); 126 CONG.
REC. 814,989 (Nov. 24, 1980). Congress. refused to impose liability on activities permitted
under federal pollution control statutes.
Subsection (j) also provides that § 107 does not affect rules of liability "under any other
provision of State or Federal law, including common law ...." 126 CONG. Rac. S14,994.
This last clause is analogous to the saving clause in § 505(e) of the Clean Water Act, and
other statutes. The better interpretation again is that Congress did not expressly preclude
or endorse federal common law nuisance. But because Congress adressed these issues, the
area is not one in which federal courts are free to create common law rules of conduct on an
ad hoc basis.
Further, the compromise bill dropped the Committee's provision for a private, federal
cause of action. 126 CONG. REc. S14,967; 14,980 (November 24, 1980). This was described as
"concession" to the House position. Id. S.14980. But, it was stated, " . . . this legislation
does not interfere with the ability to go into State court and recover for additional damages
not covered under this Federal scheme. Id. S15,003.
203. Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 101(32).
204. The term "political question" suggests the Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), doctrine of separation of powers. In light of environmental legislation becoming a major issue in
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income tax, social security, nuclear power, and a host of other
problems. The old Senate Public Works Committee is now the

Committee on Environmental and Public Works. The House too
now has committees whose continuing business includes "environmental" issues. Congress routinely orders reports concerning
EPA's efforts and the need for broader, or more limited, environmental statutes. Other committees and subcommittees also consider environmental appropriation and substantive legislation.* 5
Although congressional interest in pollution control rivals' its attention to taxation matters, one can hardly imagine a federal court
devising a common law of income tax to fill in the gaps in the coverage of the Internal Revenue Code or the Service's regulations
and rulings. The "taxation" of industries and municipalities by
federal common law nuisance standards is no more justified.
JUDICIAL POLICIES AGAINST FEDERAL NUISANCE

The continued maintenance of federal common law nuisance in
the face of specific and conflicting statutory provisions and remedies permits federal courts to ignore and rewrite substantive legislative rules. Congress, not the federal courts, has the authority to
make federal laws.ee Courts, of course, "make law" when they construe a federal statute or "fill in gaps" in legislation.0 7 The gapfilling theory has been relied upon to preserve federal common law
nuisance. Although this may have been justified in 1972, when the
statutory provisions for pollution control were scanty, 0 8 the pic-

Congress, the area is clearly one committed to another branch of the federal government.
This is one of the six factors for identifying a "political question." Id. at 217.
205. Within the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee are the subcommittees on Health and Environment and Energy and Power, in addition to Oversight and Investigations. The full committee may now be renamed the Committee on Energy and Commerce. In the House, other committees with jurisdiction over "environmental" matters
include the Interim and Insular Affairs Committee and the Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee. In the Senate, the Environment and Public Works Committee and the Energy
and Natural Resources Committee have such authority. See, e.g., BNA 11 Environmental
Reporter 985 (1980).
206. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 1; Art. VI, par. 2; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803).
207. Both of these are classic illustrations of federal common law. See Friendly, In
Praise of Erie-And the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964). One
must distinguish "gap-filling" or filling in the "interstices" of federal law from the customary judicial role of statutory. construction and interpretation. In the latter case, the court
admittedly is guided by legislative policies and presumed congressional intent and does not
fashion a federal rule and remedy from whole cloth. See Hill, The Law Making Power of the
Federal Courts: ConstitutionalPre-Emption, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1024 (1967).
208. See text accompanying notes 69-77 supra.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 12

ture is quite different today. In the presence of a comprehensive
and detailed statutory scheme for creating and enforcing environmental regulations, the federal courts usurp the legislative function
when they "promulgate" their own standards under the guise of
federal common law.
Federal common law nuisance invites the courts to second-guess
not only EPA, but also congressional balancing of national interests. For example, by defining federal nuisance as simply "any activity. . . which causes a significant injury to the legitimate activities of another," the Seventh Circuit ignored Milwaukee's
compliance with federal discharge regulations and held the city to
a higher standard of care. 0 9 This court's test in no way reflects the
technology-based standards authorized by federal statutes. This is
not gap-filling; this is legislating.
Furthermore, where a specifically applicable regulatory framework exists, a federal common law substantive rule derogates that
legislative framework. Federal common law nuisance allows plaintiffs to choose between judicial and administrative remedies.

209. In the Illinois v. Milwaukee case, the district court imposed an order prohibiting
overflows from sewers that carried both sanitary wastes and stormwater. This relief was an
additional and very expensive requirement for Milwaukee, estimated to run millions of dollars in extra expense. Although Illinois regulations normally prohibit any such "combined
sewer overflows," EPA policy and the Clean Water Act require reduction in combined sewer
overflows according to whether the necessary construction is a "cost-effective" method for
achieving applicable state and federal standards. See EPA, Office of Water Program Operations, Program Guidance Memoranda 61, 75-34 (December 16, 1975). See also EPA, Grant
Funding of Projects Requiring Treatment More Stringent Than Secondary, PRM 79-7
(March 9, 1979). Thus, not every combined sewer overflow discharge is prohibited by the
EPA and the Clean Water Act. Nor is it clear that the application of Illinois' water quality
standards would prohibit all such discharges by Milwaukee. The decision was instead based
on disputed evidence as to the relative likelihood that a discharge of untreated fecal material from Milwaukee would cause an injury to swimmers in Illinois' waters of Lake Michigan. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 173-177 (7th Cir. 1979). Had the same evidence
been presented in the NPDES program, the initial decision-maker would have been more
familiar with the technical issues involved. Had Wisconsin not accepted Illinois' position, an
adjudicatory hearing would have been held before EPA. See text accompanying notes 145146 supra. The funding issues, the need for relief sought by Illinois, the costs and benefits of
these water quality objectives could all have been considered. All parties then could have
sought federal appellate review of the propriety of the final administrative decision under
the statutory guidelines. See text accompanying note 146 supra. And, even in Illinois, at
least two Illinois municipalities are seeking to change the state requirement on combined
sewer overflow and receive approval for overflows from combined sewers in certain instances. See In the Matter of the Petition of the Galesburg Sanitary District to Amend
Regulations (IPCB No. R80-16); In the Matter of the Petition of the Village of Sauget and
the City of East St. Louis Re: Rule 452 of Chapter 3 (IPCB No. R81-12). These petitions
essentially assert that the prohibition on combined sewer overflows is unreasonable as
applied.
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Rather than participating in establishing conditions for an NPDES
permit, plaintiffs can go to court to control the discharge. As the
Seventh Circuit did in Illinois v. Milwaukee, the federal court can
give the plaintiff a remedy despite the defendant's compliance with
NPDES permit discharge limitaions. 10 A separate, common law
rule thus creates the temptation for forum-shopping. Rather than
promoting a single, national regulatory program, the substantive
rule of conduct can be fragmented by this alternate judicial forum,
and several different rules can evolve which reflect the make-up of
a given federal court."'
This provision under federal common law nuisance for an alternate cause of action also further strains limited judicial resources.
Nuisance claims are easily brought in federal court: all environmental claims present a federal question and the amount in controversy is presumed to be over $10,000.1 With current public interest in environmental problems, burgeoning federal nuisance
actions further burden already over-crowded federal dockets."'
The federal courts also are not the optimum forum for initial decision-making on the economic, engineering, biological, chemical,
toxicological, zoning and public health and welfare issues involves
in establishing acceptable discharge standards. Congress recognized this and created the EPA to specifically confront these issues
and establish national pollution control standards. 2 " The federal
courts were given the responsibility for assuring that EPA acted
properly under its statutory authority.
It is ironic that the apparent basis upon which the Supreme
Court recognized federal common law nuisance in 1972 was the

210. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
211. Venue issues under federal nuisance are not settled, but authority exists that venue
and jurisdiction could be in whatever district the harm allegedly occurs. See Ohio v. Wyandotte, 401 U.S. 493 (1971); Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling Corp., 604 F.2d 1008
(7th Cir. 1979). Under the pollution controls laws, venue for citizen suits lies in the locale of
the pollution source. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c) (1976), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(c), 7604(c)(1) (1976).
212. In Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98 (1972), Justice Douglas noted that the
jurisdictional sum was self-evident because pollution of navigable waters was involved. Because nuisance claims are so easily pleaded, many suits can be filed in the federal courts
which might be pursued in state courts or before the environmental agencies. The result is
further overburdening of the federal courts.
213. See Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary, 1979, 65 A.B.A. J. 362 (1979).
214. A key policy in the Clean Water Act is that EPA establish uniform national standards, to avoid states competing to attract industry by adopting less stringent environmental standards. E.I. duPont de Nemours Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). Ad hoc judicial,
common law standards can usurp a state's decision not to require more than the national
norm. See also text accompanying notes 215-224 infra.
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need for a "uniform rule of decision" in a controversy touching on
"basic interests of federalism. ' "15 If a "uniform rule of decision"
refers to a uniform substantive rule of decision, it has proved to be
illusory. Unlike other situations in which a single substantive rule
may be applied, 1 nuisance claims are, by definition, dependent
upon the local situation.11 Emissions of 6.8 pounds of sulphur dioxide per million BTU of heat input per hour may be entirely
healthful in one area, while elsewhere much lower emissions may
be required.2 1 ' Discharges of high concentrations of oxygen-demanding pollutants may cause no harm in a major river, while a
similar discharge into a small stream should be prohibited.2 19 Rules

may need to be further adjusted for specific situations.20 Indeed,
the Supreme Court refused to hear the multi-state antitrust claim
against the automakers precisely because of the differences in local
atmospheric conditions."21
Different legal standards can and have developed among districts and circuits under federal common law.222 Evidentiary standards of proof, moreover, can range from requiring a preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence of a
violation.22s

Because the 1972 Illinois v. Milwaukee decision al-

lowed local state environmental standards to be relevant, federal
common law nuisance can vary depending upon the states

215. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 106 n.8 (1972).
216. E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
217. A student note on Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971), argued that the
Supreme Court should not endorse federal common law nuisance because it could not provide for a uniform national standard for pollution control. Note, Federal Common Law and
InterstatePollution,85 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1972). This criticism of ad hoc decision-making
remains valid today. Indeed, Congress' choice of uniform national administrative standards
supplemented by state law adds legislative endorsement to the note's thesis. Earlier, a commentator had opined that the federal government's purported difficulties in dealing with
varying state laws was no worse than any large private concern. Note, The Federal Common
Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1512 (1969). The modern pollution control statutes are in accord and
require federal facilities to meet local standards. If EPA delegates such authority, the states
may further assume authority to directly sue violating federal facilities. See Hancock v.
Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976); EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200 (1976).
218. For example, a 1.8 standard currently applies within the Chicago, Peoria and East
St. Louis major metropolitan areas, while a 6.8 pound standard applies elsewhere within
Illinois. Illinois Pollution Control Board, Chapter 2, Rules 204(e), 204(c)(1)(A) (1979).
219. Illinois Pollution Control Board, Chapter 3, Rule'404 (1979).
220. See, e.g., ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1035 (1979).
221. Washington v. General Motors, 406 U.S. 109 (1972).
222. See text accompanying notes 50-68 supra.
223. Compare Ohio v. Wyandotte, 401 U.S. 493, 501-02, 504-05 (1971), with Illinois v.
Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 166 (7th Cir. 1979).
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involved. 2"
It is possible that the Court did not really believe that federal
common law nuisance would provide a uniform emission or discharge standard. It might have meant that nuisance would be decided in a uniform manner. If that were so, we then return to the
primary issue: whether federal district courts should be independent standard-setters, acting independently of the statutory framework and administrative mechanisms directed by Congress. The
answer should be clear that the courts should not.
CONCLUSION

There is no convincing rationale for federal common law nuisance. Federal common law cannot establish a uniform substantive
rule of decision, nor can federal courts pretend they are the EPA.
The courts are not authorized by Congress to be an independent
source of substantive environmental standards. Furthermore, environmental control is now in the mainstream of national political
debate. To say that courts can fill the gaps or interstices of legislation or regulation (except by virtue of statutory construction) is to
allow the courts to decide issues Congress is now debating. Finally,
the existence of a federal judicial remedy simply detracts from federal administrative and state court remedies, contrary to congressional policy. The extent and complexity of federal statutes and
regulations attest to the comprehensive federal plan for pollution
control. The federal courts play an important role in the review of
administrative actions and the enforcement of final agency requirements. Procedures are provided for settling interstate disputes like
Illinois v. Milwaukee. State law is preserved and serves as a basis
for awarding damages where injury is sustained by private
persons. 28
Moreover, how many times should a private concern be required
to satisfy the government? If a company meets the standards set
by EPA, a federal court should not usurp that administrative role
by imposing a separate, more stringent standard. The point is not
one of bureaucracy; it is one of fairness and economics. Private
concerns ought not to be held to a higher standard of expertise
than the environmental agencies which are expected to be experts
in the field. While, as a practical matter, many companies do act to
minimize environmental injuries to a greater extent than that re224.
225.

Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972).
See note 189 supra and accompanying text.
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quired by statute, they do so for internal, business reasons. Businesses and municipalities should be held to their statutory responsibilities, subject to judicial review and enforcement. It is the
"expert" agencies that ought to be held to the public trust they
occupy.,
In its brief before the Supreme Court in the reconsideration of
Illinois v. Milwaukee, the EPA has urged that federal common law
nuisance should be retained. 2 7 The EPA's theory is that nuisance
is needed because Congress has not passed requisite legislation.
Courts are not legislative bodies, however, and environmental issues are on the congressional and political agenda. The executive
branch should not be permitted to bypass the Congress and seek
enforcement of substantive remedies not promulgated under duly
enacted legislation.
Finally, two words from the sponsor of government regulation-we who pay for environmental protection. First, the costs of
goods and services we consume include the expense of pollution
control associated with production. Although some of these costs
surely return significant benefits, there is no benefit in duplicate,
judicial regulation. By maintaining federal common law nuisance,
the courts encourage needless litigation costs. Second, pollution
control in the 1980's will become increasingly costly and difficult.
Notwithstanding the considerable progress made to date in controlling emissions of pollutants, reducing the remaining portion of
discharges and emissions will be more difficult. 228 Careful engineer226. One can hardly imagine a more generous legislative mandate for pollution control
than that present in the federal statutes. A primary goal of the Clean Water Act is the
cessation of discarges. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976). Achievement of ambient air quality standards and preservation of existing cleaner air areas is required by the Clean Air Act. 42
U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2), 7461-69 (1976). "Cradle-to-grave" controls of hazardous wastes are demanded by RCRA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-25 (1976). These commands are ambitious, but equally
significant is that they are not deficient in their goals nor in their basic authorization for
EPA action.
227. Brief of Amicus Curiae, United States at 15-16. No. 79-408.
228. Because of the diminishing returns and the possibility that unregulated sources
might be controlled more efficiently, EPA has urged states to use alternative approaches.
For example, instead of requiring a new type of paint or expensive control equipment to
reduce organic emissions, states might provide additional controls on degreasers. Such controls could be easier and less costly. See 44 Fed. Reg. 3741-44 (1979). Controls on wastewater discharges can involve changes in the raw materials used. E.g., Alton Box Board Co. v.
EPA, 592 F.2d 395, 400 (7th Cir. 1979). Additionally, the requirements of the RCRA can
extend to the initial point at which a waste material is generated within a manufacturing
facility. 45 Fed. Reg. 33095 (1980). EPA must also evaluate the economic impact of its regulations. See Executive Order 11821, as amended Executive Order 11949, 42 Fed. Reg. 1017
(Dec. 31, 1976). For a synopsis of the achievements of the past ten years, see Decade of the

1981]

Federal Common Law Nuisance

ing and corporate planning are needed to meet the forthcoming
federal statutory standards in an efficient manner. In this "environment," litigation and ad hoc judicial decision-making can only
be disruptive and unduly costly.
In 1972, the Supreme Court was correct in recognizing federal
common law nuisance, because Congress had not yet provided a
remedy for interstate pollution. Now Congress has acted and continues to debate the issue of environmental protection. If under
the banner of federal common law nuisance federal courts may
override the federal legislative standards and procedures, they will
have created a non-statutory body of law which would be essentially of a constitutional dimension. That would be a truly startling
holding.2 29 The Court seems reluctant to create and sanction a
non-statutory federal rule of decision. 8 0 Sound principles of judicial decision-making support this reserve. 23 Hopefully, the Court
will recognize this principle and its applicability in Illinois v. Milwaukee 23 2 and lay federal common law nuisance to rest.

Environment, 6 EPA J. 10 (EPA Office of Public Awareness, 1980).
229. The lower federal courts, when directly faced with the issue, have held there is no
federal constitutional right to a clean environment. See Township of Long Beach v. City of
New York, 445 F. Supp. 1203, 1217 (D. N.J. 1978), and cases cited therein. The existence of
a constitutional rule would substantially moot decisions analyzing Congress' careful choices
of substantive and procedural requirements in the federal statutes. E.g., E.I. duPont de
Nemours Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Assoc., 49 U.S.L.W.
4008, 15 E.R.C. 1209 (No. 79-770, December 2, 1980). Arguments on standing and whether a
party was within the zone of environmental interests protected by federal law would also be
illusory. E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
230. E.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). There the Court analogized the relationship of federal judicial authority vis-a-vis Congress to Sir Thomas
Moore's search for "the law":
The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal, not what's right. And I'll stick to
what's legal... I'm not God. The currents and eddies of right and wrong, which
you find such plain-sailing, I can't navigate, I'm no voyager. But in the thickets of
the law, oh there I'm a forester. . .What would you do? Cut a great road through
the law to get after the Devil? . . . And when the last law was down, and the Devil
turned round on you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This
country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast-Man's laws, not
God's-and if you cut them down ... d'you really think you could stand upright
in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my
own safety's sake.
Bolt, A Man For All Seasons, Act I, at 147 (Heineman ed. 1967), cited at 437 U.S. 195.
231.

See Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1057, 1061, 1067, 1109 (1975).

232.

445 U.S. 926 (1980).

